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Abstract
Past computational models of settlement bargaining have lacked
explicit game theoretic foundations. Algorithmic game theory, however,
offers techniques that can find perfect Bayesian equilibria even where
closed-form mathematical solutions may be intractable. Some recent
mathematical models tackle two-sided asymmetric information,
including evidentiary signals models, in which the judgment is a sum of
both shared and independent private information, and correlated signals
models, in which both parties receive noisy signals about the same
information. To relax assumptions inherent in these models, this paper
employs several progressively more complicated techniques, including
iterative elimination of dominated alternatives, no regret learning, and
counterfactual regret minimization. Although these algorithms are not
guaranteed to produce Nash equilibria in general-sum games like
litigation, they nonetheless succeed in producing either exact or close
approximate equilibria on discrete versions of the corresponding
mathematical models. A single algorithmic game theory model can
incorporate a number of features that state-of-the-art mathematical
models cannot handle simultaneously, such as two-sided correlated
signals of both liability and damages, risk aversion, and options to
concede.
1 Introduction
Builders of settlement bargaining models feel about computer simulations the
same way that builders at construction sites feel about duct tape. Like duct
tape, a computer simulation can be used to plug an occasional hole, but only
temporarily and only with a little bit of embarrassment. With modern devel-
opments in algorithmic game theory, however, model builders no longer need to
apologize for using simulations. Mathematical models that produce clean, ex-
act, closed-form solutions will always have a beauty that computational models
lack. But computer simulations have a corresponding advantage, their ability
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in many cases to engage far richer modeling environments. In the physics lit-
erature, some specialties remain the province of mathematics (e.g., quantum
mechanics), others are dominated by simulation (e.g., hydrodynamics), and in
still others, the two modeling approaches exist side by side (e.g., traffic). This
paper’s modest suggestion is that the settlement bargaining literature should
move to this last state of happy symbiosis. Computational modeling should not
and will not replace mathematical modeling, but the combination of the two
can advance understanding better than either alone.
Historically, the principal problem with computational models has been that
the players’ expectations about trial and their strategies in settlement negotia-
tions are defined exogenously. The mathematical literature on settlement bar-
gaining, on the other hand, seeks to derive the strategies that rational players
will play. The output of successful modern mathematical models is often a per-
fect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, the parties’ beliefs and
strategies are in sync. That is, each player’s strategies, on issues such as what
settlement offers to make, are rational given the player’s beliefs about the other
party’s information and strategy; moreover, the game play given the strate-
gies confirms that the players’ beliefs are correct. In contrast, a computational
model in the original Priest and Klein (1984) [19] model of selection effects in
litigation exogenously sets litigants’ beliefs, assuming that litigants will settle
cases when and only when the litigants are mutually optimistic and the degree
of their mutual optimism exceeds the sum of the difference between their trial
and settlement costs. Some computational approaches, such as Ryll (1996) [21],
derive strategies based on learning rules, but without constraining the learning
rules to Bayesian rationality. Others, such as Hylton (2002) [12], first derive
models mathematically and then simulate results given the formulas proven. If
a computer simulation must be told what the equilibrium strategies are, it is
useful only after the mathematical model has done the real work, or as a cheat
when an equilibrium cannot be found but we have a hypothesis as to what it
might be.
Algorithmic game theory differs from computational models traditional in
the settlement bargaining literature in that it includes various techniques that
seek to identify Bayesian Nash equilibria. A caveat is that these techniques
seek to identify only approximate equilibria rather than exact equilibria. In
zero-sum games like poker, some algorithms have convergence guarantees, so
that with enough algorithm iterations, one can obtain an arbitrarily close equi-
librium, such as one where no party could gain more than a dollar by deviating
from that party’s approximate equilibrium strategy. Unfortunately, litigation
is a general-sum game; one party’s losses are not the other party’s gain if the
losses are due to legal expenses. The algorithms give poor convergence guar-
antees for general-sum games. But all is not lost, and indeed we will see that
this caveat does not necessarily present insurmountable problems for modeling
settlement bargaining. Algorithmic game theory techniques can be used to de-
termine just how good an approximate equilibrium is. At least in the games
modeled here, we will see that the game is considerably closer to equilibrium
than one could expect any human to play, even though the algorithms do not
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guarantee this outcome for all general-sum games. Indeed, even without any
guarantees of achieving convergence, the algorithms are often successful in find-
ing demonstrably exact solutions, differing from perfection only by miniscule
rounding errors. Although the steps to arrive at those solutions are different
from the steps of a mathematical model, the results are no less Bayesian.
An alternative critique of computational models is that they are not neces-
sary. The relevant features of litigation are not all that complicated, and thus
mathematics can do the work without any help, thank you very much. This
argument might appeal to someone unfamiliar with the literature, because one
can devise simple rules about how litigants obtain information about the merits,
and one might imagine that it would be easy to solve for the parties’ strategies.
But even with very simple models, identification of equilibrium strategies may
be quite difficult. The economist who has toiled to solve settlement bargaining
models and has ambitious dreams of extending such models knows that model-
ing settlement bargaining in full fidelity to Bayes is challenging. At the heart of
the challenge is that litigation is an asymmetric information game. A plaintiff
and a defendant may have different information, or they might have different
beliefs about the same information. Even if the distributions from which the
information is drawn are known, solving for an equilibrium strategy may be
dauntingly difficult. This is especially so if the model is to incorporate some
features that seem important, such as two-sided asymmetric information, risk
aversion, parties’ options to concede rather than fight, and the possibility of
uncertainty about both liability and damages.
Still, if any computational model could be solved with equal ease mathemat-
ically, then the computational approach would be clearly inferior. We will see,
however, that this is not the case. There may well be some problems that are
easier to solve with a mathematical approach, and we will point out some types
of mathematical modeling that algorithmic game theory cannot (yet) handle.
But we will see that computational models can easily mimic some of the most
demanding mathematical models of settlement bargaining, and moreover that
algorithms can improve on those models by relaxing key assumptions. Many
changes that would require extensive reworking of mathematical models can be
effected in a computational model with a few short lines of code at no cost of
algorithmic complexity. Other changes can be achieved but at a price of a slower
algorithm. The computational approaches documented here cannot incorporate
an arbitrary number of seemingly relevant features, but often, they can juggle
more variables than mathematical models. At least sometimes, this gain may
be sufficient to make them a valuable complement to closed-form mathematical
models with smaller numbers of variables.
When a computational model incorporates all the features of a mathematical
model plus some additional useful features that are not easily added mathemat-
ically, the results provide a strong indication of what a hypothetical mathemat-
ical model with those features would show. The results must still be treated
with some caution for two reasons. First, it is possible that the discreteness
of computational models may produce differences from models using contin-
uous variables. That danger can be reduced by allowing for more strategies
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(for example, allowing for more discrete signals or more discrete settlement
offers). We will also see that computational models sometimes allow for less
discreteness than some mathematical models, for example converting a binary
signal in an existing model into a range of possible signals. Second, just be-
cause some pattern occurs in selected simulations with particular parameters
does not guarantee that it would occur in any broader universe of simulations
with other parameters. Still, simulations can be run with many different sets
of parameters, and if they include more features than a corresponding mathe-
matical model, they expand the number of dimensions of a problem that can be
considered. Running various simulations produces data that can be analyzed
with empirical techniques. At the very least, computational models can guide
paths for future research. Surely researchers would consult an oracle that could
tell them the results they might achieve if successful in solving for a unique
equilibrium in a mathematical approach. Sometimes computational models can
serve this function, for example by showing researchers that relaxing a seem-
ingly innocent assumption will change fundamental results or that relaxing a
seemingly significant assumption will not do so. The oracle might not be able to
answer everything or might sometimes respond with less precise answers than
one would like, but it is still worth consulting.
The literature on settlement bargaining is vast and contains many useful
features that we will not cover here. The focus will be on three recent cut-
ting edge models of settlement bargaining with two-sided asymmetric informa-
tion. The first, Friedman and Wittman (2006) [8], provides a foundation for
Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno (2019) [6], who extend the model to allow for
fee-shifting, and Klerman, Lee, and Liu (2018) [13], who focus on rigorously
analyzing the selection of disputes for litigation. Each of the papers includes
lengthy rigorous proofs that substantially improve understanding. Each also
makes a number of simplifying assumptions, and this paper will use compu-
tational models to analyze how relaxing these assumptions affects the results.
For each paper, we will use a different technique of algorithmic game theory,
beginning with the elementary and familiar method of iterative elimination of
dominated strategies, used to model linear strategies; continuing with no regret
learning, which enables the parties to use nonlinear strategies by separately
optimizing at different information sets; and culminating in counterfactual re-
gret minimization, which rigorously allows the optimization at each information
set to account for the distribution of cases that will reach that information set
given other parties’ current strategies. Counterfactual regret minimization is
the algorithm that revolutionized computer performance in the game of poker,
an asymmetric information game with an information structure that has much
in common with litigation.
Part 2 will introduce each of the three mathematical models, and Part 3
will elaborate on computational extensions for each one. Part 4 concludes.
The source code for all simulations reported is available at https://github.com/
mbabramo/ACESim4/tree/CRM.
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2 Mathematically Modeling Two-Sided
Asymmetric Information
First-generation settlement bargaining models were non-Bayesian. The canoni-
cal articles of Landes (1971) [15], Posner (1973) [18], and Gould (1973) [10] as-
sumed that cases would settle when, taking the parties’ divergent expectations
of the result of litigation as givens, settlement would produce a social surplus.
This assumption may seem natural given bargaining in the style of Coase (1960)
[5], but Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) [16] later showed that when parties’
valuations differ, bargaining cannot be guaranteed to produce efficient results
absent subsidies. Moreover, models in this tradition, including Priest and Klein
(1984), beg the question of how the parties formed their expectations.
2.1 One-Sided Information Models
Most of the Bayesian mathematical literature on settlement bargaining incor-
porates models of one-sided asymmetric information. One party knows the
strength of the case, and the other party knows only the distribution of out-
comes. Sometimes, the plaintiff is the party with the information, while at other
times the defendant has the information. Sometimes, the information concerns
damages (with liability conceded), while at other times the information con-
cerns the probability of liability (with damages uncontested). Sometimes, the
party with the information makes an offer, thus potentially signaling the party’s
type (i.e., conveying credible information about the information that the party
possesses), while at other times the party without the information makes the
offer, thus potentially screening the more knowledgeable party based on its type
(i.e., leading the more knowledgeable party to take some action consistent with
its information).
For example, Bebchuk (1984) [1] assumes that the defendant knows the
probability that liability will be imposed, while the plaintiff knows only the cu-
mulative distribution of the probability of liability across all cases. Because the
cumulative distribution determines the expected total payout, the model is gen-
eral enough to apply equally to uncertainty about the level of damages or even
uncertainty about both liability and damages. The unknowledgeable plaintiff
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the knowledgeable defendant. The model is
thus a screening model. The equilibrium derived is a partial pooling equilib-
rium, in which the defendant types with relatively strong defenses reject offers,
and the defendant types with relatively weak defenses accept offers. Meanwhile,
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) [20], while still imagining the plaintiff making an
offer, assume that only the plaintiff is endowed with the relevant information.
Over some range of plaintiff offers, the defendant plays a mixed strategy, with
some positive probability less than 1 of accepting the offer. Below the range,
the defendant accepts all offers; above the range, the defendant rejects all.
Early work on two-sided asymmetric information models endows the litigants
with different types of information. Schweizer (1985) [22] features two types of
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plaintiff and two types of defendant. The plaintiff receives either good or bad
news about the probability of liability, and the defendant receives either good
or bad news about the level of damages. The defendant proposes settlement
terms that the plaintiff must accept or reject. The model produces multiple
equilibria, including both separating and pooling, though at least one criterion
for refining equilibria narrows the result down to a single outcome. Daughety
and Reinganum (1994) [7] allow either party to propose a settlement and reverse
the information structure, with the plaintiff having information about damages
and the defendant, about liability. The model allows for continuous types, and
information about damages and liability can be combined into a single variable
representing litigation strength. They derive equilibria, showing that the rate
of trial may differ depending on which party proposes a settlement, with the
rate depending on parameter values.
Any model will have unrealistic assumptions, and the fundamental question
is whether those assumptions make a difference. The problem, of course, is that
one can resolve such questions only with intuition or with new models. One
view of the status quo is that models in which expectations are endogenous
may be no better than the first-generation divergent expectations models in
which they are exogenous. Gelbach (2018) [9] offers a reduced form model that
shows that the approaches may not be all that different. Gelbach shows that
even the Landes-Posner-Gould model can be constructed with rational Bayesian
expectations, if cost parameters are allowed to vary across cases instead of being
fixed. From this perspective, perhaps the sacrifices needed to achieve Bayesian
rationality are too great. Certainly, many issues of interest can be fruitfully
modeled without common priors. Spier and Prescott (2019) [23], for example,
model contracting between litigants and with third parties on the outcome of the
litigation, a task that would be considerably more difficult in a fully Bayesian
model.
Still, it may also be useful to generate more realistic Bayesian models. The
challenge that we will focus on here is two-sided asymmetric information in
which both parties have information of the same sort, such as information on
liability or information on damages (or, as our computational models will tackle
later, independent information on each). The vast majority of litigated cases,
after all, likely involve differences in the information that the parties have (or
in beliefs about such information), and it is not a priori obvious whether the
conclusions of the models discussed above extend to the case in which both
parties have estimates of the same sort. Of course, depending on the topic of
interest, a model must include additional features, and indeed the intellectual
history to be relayed below shows one model, the Friedman and Wittman (2006)
[8] model, extended in very different directions. Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno
(2019) [6] extend the model to study various fee-shifting rules, while Klerman,
Lee, and Liu (2018) [13] offer different extensions focused on placing the Priest-
Klein model on a Bayesian foundation. This section reviews these models to
identify their commonalities, differences, and assumptions that computational
models may be able to relax. After reviewing the models, we will use a separate
technique to enhance each model computationally.
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2.2 Friedman and Wittman’s Averaged Signals Model
In the one-sided information models, the structure of bargaining often affects
which party receives most of the surplus. Friedman and Wittman avoid this
problem by adopting the bargaining protocol of Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1983) [4]. In Chaterjee-Samuelson bargaining, the plaintiff and defendant si-
multaneously submit offers. If the plaintiff’s exceeds the defendant’s, the case
definitively settles at the midpoint; otherwise, bargaining has failed. Costs of
trial are borne only in the event of bargaining failure. Friedman and Wittman
justify this choice not on the ground that the protocol is commonly used (it
is not), but on the ground that it provides a useful reduced form of a more
complicated bargaining process. In contrast to divergent expectations models,
with Chaterjee-Samuelson bargaining, a case may go to trial even though there
is a social surplus from settlement given the parties’ expectations. The reason
is that the parties may shade their offers in the hope of deriving a larger portion
of the settlement surplus, even at the risk of bargaining failure.
The informational structure is arrestingly simple. The plaintiff observes a
signal θp drawn from a known distribution, and the defendant independently
observes a signal θd drawn from the same distribution. The principal results
of the paper apply to a “basic litigation model” in which the distribution is
the uniform distribution; this extends without loss of generality to any uniform
distribution between a lower bound of L and an upper bound of U . In the event
that settlement fails, a judgment is entered in the amount of the average (θp +
θd)/2. This assumption makes the model tractable. It may seem problematic
for the judgment to depend on the signals, rather than for the signals to depend
on the underlying truth to be revealed at judgment. We will return to that issue
when we discuss the correlated signals model, but one can imagine circumstances
in which this is realistic. For example, the parties might have information about
different components of damages in a case in which liability is uncontested, and
should trial ensue, the information will be revealed and the judgment will be
the sum.
The Friedman and Wittman tour de force is their derivation of a Nash equi-
librium in the basic litigation game. In this equilibrium, the plaintiff will ordi-
narily offer 23θp − 2c +
1
2 , and the defendant will ordinarily offer
2
3θd + 2c −
1
6 ,
where c represents each party’s trial cost. The word “ordinarily” signals what
may seem a mild caveat: Neither party will ever make an offer beyond the
range of the other party’s possible offers. Thus, the plaintiff’s offers are trun-
cated above at min(1, 2c+ 12 ) and below at max(0, 2c−
1
6 ), while the defendant’s
offers are truncated above at min(1, 76 − 2c) and below at max(0,−2c+
1
2 ).
These truncations may seem unimportant, because they will never affect
whether a case will settle. But the plaintiff’s lower truncation increases the
plaintiff’s surplus from settlement, and the defendant’s upper truncation has
the reverse effect. Indeed, we will see later that the piecewise linearity of the
model is critical to proving a Nash equilibrium. Friedman and Wittman do not
eliminate the possibility that there might be some nonlinear Nash equilibrium,
but they prove that the equilibrium they derive is the unique nontrivial piecewise
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linear equilibrium. There are also infinitely many trivial equilibria, in which the
plaintiff’s settlement demands always exceed the defendant’s. We will return
to the challenges inherent in filtering out these equilibria when we develop a
computational model.
Friedman and Wittman’s model permits them to focus on the trial rate.
They derive a piecewise quadratic formula for the trial rate, and they also exam-
ine, in the tradition of Priest-Klein, how the trial rate varies near the midpoint
of the decision spectrum. They show that when trial costs are sufficiently low
(c < 16 ), the probability of a trial is higher, the farther the judgment would be
from 12 , and when trial costs exceed this threshold, the probability of a trial is
highest at the 12 point. The intuition is that when costs are high, the parties
become more generous, and so the plaintiff’s range of offers will be below the
defendant’s. The truncations then ensure that cases at the extremes, where
either both parties receive a low signal or both parties receive a high signal, are
more likely to settle. When trial costs are low, the parties are less generous,
and the plaintiff’s range of offers will be above the defendant’s. Cases at the
extremes are then less likely to settle. With the basic litigation game, the 16
cost threshold occurs where the parties’ range of offers are equal. Friedman and
Wittman also offer a graphical argument that extends to other continuous dis-
tributions, though they do not expressly consider the case where liability rather
than damages is uncertain.
The Friedman and Wittman model can be extended only with considerable
effort. Most fundamentally, it does not extend easily to a case in which the
expected judgment is not simply the sum of two parties’ signals. What if a
weighted sum is used, or if the judgment is a more complex function of the
signals? But even accepting the averaging of the two signals, many questions
arise. One might wonder, for example, what would happen to variables such as
trial rate and the distribution of tried disputes if the parties were risk averse, or
if one of the parties is risk averse while the other is not. Or one might wonder
what the effect would be of an offer-of-settlement rule, in which the trial court
punishes parties who make offers that after the judgment seem stingy. Certainly
the Friedman and Wittman model can help generate intuitions on these matters,
but the real answer to these questions is that new models are needed. We will
see how a computational model can easily be adapted to these situations.
2.3 Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno’s
Evidentiary Signals Model
Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno (2019) illustrate the challenge of building on Fried-
man and Wittman by successfully extending the model to fee shifting. The
article includes an online appendix with 60 pages of proofs. The difficulty stems
from the need to address four principal cases, depending on relative values
of parameters, and within these principal cases, to make various calculations
that depend on the relative values of other parameters, including in many in-
stances five different formulas for five different ranges of a variable. The resulting
product is testimony both to human ingenuity and to endurance, and it makes
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breakthroughs in our understanding of the effects of fee-shifting with two-sided
asymmetric information.
As in Friedman and Wittman, plaintiff and defendant receive signals, now
denoted θΠ and θ∆, respectively, and the judgment is an average of the signals.
Now, however, both parties have common knowledge of the true merits of the
litigation, denoted by q. The signals thus do not serve the function of informing
the parties of the true merits, but rather of providing the parties with evidence
that they may use to convince the court. The plaintiff’s signal θΠ is drawn
from a uniform distribution on the interval (0, q), and the defendant’s signal,
on the interval (q, 1). Because the defendant’s signal can be no less than q,
the plaintiff’s best possible evidence, where θΠ = q, would convince the court
that the judgment must be at least q. Similarly, the defendant’s best possible
evidence, where θ∆ = q, would convince the court that the judgment must be
no more than q. But the litigants do not always draw the best possible evidence.
The fee shifting rule that Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno primarily analyze
is triggered based on (1) whether the final judgment is above or below 12 (i.e.,
which party “wins” in the sense of being awarded more than half of the contested
damages), and (2) whether the evidence of the winning party is sufficiently
strong. If the judgment is less than 12 , then the defendant might be able to
shift its costs to the plaintiff, but only if the defendant’s signal falls below some
threshold, i.e. θ∆ < t, where 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Likewise, if the judgment is greater than
1
2 , then the plaintiff might be able to shift its costs to the defendant, but only if
the plaintiff’s signal exceeds a threshold, i.e. θΠ > 1− t. An intuition is that if
a party wins a case merely because its opponent has produced little evidence, a
court will not order fee-shifting; another is that a court will only order shifting
of fees when those fees were spent on producing strong evidence. Note that
when t = 0, fees will never be shifted, so this extreme is the American rule of
no fee shifting, and when t = 1, fees will always be shifted to a winning party
(i.e., to the plaintiff if the final judgment exceeds 12 and to the defendant if the
final judgment is less than 12 ), so that extreme is the English rule of universal
fee shifting. The analysis thus effectively allows for a continuum of fee shifting
rules.
This information structure enables Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno to derive the
offers that the parties will make. They prove that each party’s offer function is
a best response to its opponent’s offer function and thus that a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium exists. They also derive formulas for settlement amounts, along
with identification of the ranges of parameters values where such settlements
occur, and accordingly of the litigation rate. They prove that the litigation rate
depends only on c (now representing the combined trial cost of the two parties)
and is thus independent of both case quality q and the fee-shifting rule t. This
produces the surprising conclusion that the litigation rate is the same under both
the American and the English rule. Finally, they offer a calculation of litigation
accuracy, and they prove that when costs are below a certain threshold, the
English rule produces more accuracy than the American rule, while the reverse
is true when costs are above a certain threshold. The stylized fact that litigation
is cheaper in England may thus help explain the choice of rule in each country.
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The Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno model adopts a number of assumptions,
mostly for purposes of tractability. Let us identify many of these assumptions,
so that we can assess whether they present concerns about the generality of the
conclusions and whether a computational model might be able to relax them.
Structural constraints
Piecewise linearity Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno explicitly assume a lin-
ear relationship between the parties’ signals and their offers. They allow, how-
ever, for discontinuities in the linear relationship. In this sense, the strate-
gies they model are similar to those of Friedman and Wittman, and indeed
Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno similarly truncate the parties’ strategies. The
assumption is somewhat stronger, however, in that Friedman and Wittman
demonstrated that the piecewise linear strategies they derived would be a Nash
equilibrium even when nonlinear strategies are possible. On the other hand,
Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno allow for additional discontinuities at points where
fee-shifting would change. This is central to the design of their model and the
thrust of their analysis. Because fee-shifting depends partly on the quality of
the evidence possessed by the winning party, a litigant will know whether it
will be entitled to fee-shifting if it wins, and the signal values at which this fact
changes are points at which Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno are able to break the
problem down into smaller pieces. Piecewise linearity thus allows for explicit
modeling of the effects of changes in a fee-shifting rule, but because it is unclear
how restrictive this assumption is, it is a prime candidate for relaxation in a
computational model.
Asymmetric information quality equivalence Recall that the plain-
tiff receives a signal in the range (0, q) and the defendant, in (q, 1). As a con-
sequence, when q > 12 , the plaintiff’s signal has a greater potential effect than
the defendant’s, and when q < 12 , the reverse is true. The single variable q thus
serves two, independent functions in the model: one is to represent the “true
merits” of the case, while the other is to represent the degree of information
asymmetry. This greatly increases the tractability of the model, and plausibly
it allows for consideration of both issues related to accuracy and issues related to
information asymmetry. The problem, though, is that the issues are necessarily
conflated; where a case is at an extreme of the probability distribution, there
is always high information asymmetry. There is no particular reason to believe
that true merits should generally track information asymmetry in this way. The
question thus arises whether the results would be the same if the model allowed
independent variation of true merits and information asymmetry.
Parameter values
Balanced asymmetric information Meanwhile, the true merits vari-
able is constrained so that 13 ≤ q ≤
2
3 . The reason for this constraint is that
10
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with more extreme values of q, the increasingly one-sided nature of asymmetric
information leads the pure strategy equilibria derived by the authors to break
down. This highlights once again the problematic nature of asymmetric infor-
mation quality equivalence, because it means that the authors not only cannot
model situations with relatively high information asymmetry, but also that they
cannot model situations in which the true merits of a case are near the extremes
of the probability distribution. Perhaps a computational model might be able to
find an equilibrium with relatively extreme quality values and/or with relatively
extreme information asymmetry, and this could help extend the understandings
provided by the model.
Low or moderate cost The authors make an implicit assumption that
the cost variable is not so high that the plaintiff’s untruncated offer range is
entirely below the defendant’s untruncated offer range. This implicit assumption
also exists in Friedman and Wittman. The truncation functions defined by
Friedman and Wittman are undefined, because when their c is sufficiently high,
they instruct that the plaintiff’s offers should be truncated above at 1 and below
at a number greater than 1, and similarly the defendant’s offers are truncated
below at 0 and above at a number less than 0. With sufficiently high costs,
there will be many Nash equilibria; the parties will be determined not to go to
trial, but neither party would deviate from any positive allocation of the surplus
from settlement. A computational model may be able to handle high costs, if
the equilibria are subject to additional refinements.
Risk neutrality The plaintiff and defendant are assumed to be risk neu-
tral. Incorporating risk aversion (especially the possibility of asymmetric risk
aversion) into the model would likely add considerable challenge, though the ar-
gument could still proceed in case-by-case fashion. Incorporating risk aversion
is virtually costless to a computational model, requiring only the transforma-
tion of the parties’ utilities in any game outcome. A computational model could
also easily incorporate behavioral assumptions, such as regret aversion, which
Guthrie (1999) [11] argues may help explain litigation behavior.
Game structure
Fee-shifting structure Recall that fee shifting depends on which party
wins more than half of the judgment at trial and also on the quality of the evi-
dence produced by the winning party. One might imagine alternative bases for
fee-shifting. For example, fee-shifting might depend on the evidence produced
by the losing party. The intuition would be that the court is punishing the
losing party for proceeding with such a weak case. Meanwhile, one might also
shift fees based on both parties’ evidence. Indeed, Dari-Mattiacci and Sara-
ceno explicitly consider fee-shifting based on the margin of victory, defined by
a parameter m, where 0 ≤ m ≤ 1. With this approach, if θΠ + θ∆ < m, then
the plaintiff must pay the defendant’s fees, and if θΠ + θ∆ > 2 −m, then the
11
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defendant must pay the plaintiff’s fees. In this regime, if m = 0, no fee shifting
occurs (the American rule), and if m = 1, fee shifting always occurs absent an
evenly split judgment (the English rule); thus, the margin-of-victory approach
converges with the other approaches at the extremes. Dari-Mattiacci and Sara-
ceno explicitly calculate the parties’ offers under this approach, but they do
not prove their results related to accuracy. This raises the question whether
their accuracy results are robust to the alternative specification. One might
also imagine other fee-shifting rules, such as a quadratic rule that imposes a
fee-shifting schedule progressive in the distance from the middle of the spec-
trum or one styled as an offer-of-settlement rule based on the distance between
the judgment and the parties’ offers. Changing the fee-shifting rule should be
trivial in a computational model.
Damages vs. liability Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno explicitly describe
their model as one in which the parties are arguing about how to divide a
disputed asset, such as in a case of divorce, and they point out that without
loss of generality, this can be extended to a judicial determination of damages
between some minimum and maximum value. An extension would be to consider
cases where liability is at issue, i.e. where the plaintiff will receive 1 if θΠ +
θ∆ > 1 and 0 otherwise. For example, they might generalize the model to an
arbitrary cumulative distribution function mapping θΠ +θ∆ onto the judgment,
but this would add considerable challenge. Once again, this should be trivial
in a computational model, which need only transform the judgment values in
particular cases, either to 0 or 1 or based on some other distribution.
Signal variance independent of true merits Dari-Mattiacci and Sara-
ceno refer to the signals that the parties receive as “evidence” of the true merits
of the case, but there is a paradox: The parties are assumed to know the true
merits of the case (q) and indeed use this information in constructing their offer
functions. Thus the variance in the signals that each party may receive has
nothing to do with the merits. Given the fixed value of q, whether the plaintiff
receives a signal slightly above 0 or slightly below q tells the plaintiff nothing
about the true merits. What receipt of the signal accomplishes is to inform the
plaintiff about the plaintiff’s likely ability to persuade the judge about the true
merits. The judge does not know the true merits, but is trying to guess the
true merits. The higher q, the higher the parties’ signals will tend to be, so
the judge’s strategy is reasonable, even if non-Bayesian. But the result is that
from the perspective of the parties, for whom q is fixed, the randomness in case
outcomes has to do only with who is lucky in finding promising evidence.
This point can also clearly be seen in a transformation of the model that
Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno offer. They note that the signals θΠ and θ∆ can be
mapped one-to-one onto signals from 0 to 1, which they label zΠ and z∆. These
signals are thus independent signals from a unit uniform distribution, and the
θ signals can be derived from them according to the formulas θΠ = qzΠ and
θ∆ = q + (1− q)z∆. This highlights that the θ signals result from commingling
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the true merits of the case and the random uniform distribution draws. With







(qzΠ + (1− q)z∆) (1)
As this presentation makes clear, the judgment amount is half based on the
true merits of the case, independent of any evidence presented by the parties.
Meanwhile, the amount is half based on a weighted average of the parties’
uniform distribution draws, with the weights equal to q. Recall that q represents
the degree of information asymmetry, as well as the true merits. Thus, in effect,
half of the judge’s decision is based on the true merits and half of the judge’s
decision depends on a weighted average of signals that are entirely independent
of the true merits. The only reason that this makes sense from the perspective of
the judge is that the weighting variable happens to reflect not only information
asymmetry, but also, as a result of the signal variance independent of true
merits assumption, the true merits. From the perspective of the parties, the
judge might as well be responding based on the judge’s political inclinations
or the breakfast cereal the judge ate that morning, with the parties’ evidence
concerning those matters rather than the merits. The question is whether this
affects the results of the model.
It might appear that a simple change in conceptual approach could make
irrelevant the problem of the independence of the signal variance and the mer-
its. Suppose we conceive of the independent z signals as being part of the
true merits, rather than separate from the true merits. On this formulation,
q represents knowledge that the parties share about the true merits, and the
z signals represent private information about the true merits. The judge adds
these together, weighing the z signals by the information asymmetry (which
happens to equal q) to obtain the true merits. With this reformulation, the
model remains a two-sided asymmetric information model, but the signals are
genuinely signals of the merits, even if they are weighted by some variable other
than the true merits. Critically, if the weighting variable happens to be q, this
conceptual reformulation has no impact at all on which cases settle. The par-
ties’ offers remain the same functions of their signals as before. We simply need
to measure accuracy relative to J , considering the judgment to be the correct
answer and comparing it to the case outcome, including fee shifting and costs.
This would indeed eliminate any lingering concern about the extent to which
the independence of signal variance and the true merits is driving model results.
The problem is that, as their title reflects, one of Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno’s
principal results relates to accuracy, and they define accuracy relative to true
merits, defined in turn as q. Let us thus turn to their definition of accuracy.
Accuracy definition Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno define inaccuracy in their
appendix as “the square distance between the expected outcome Et and the
merits q.” Let us analyze this from right to left, beginning with q.
13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3709964
Definition of true merits As noted above, the use of q, known to both
parties, highlights that the signals that the parties receive tell them nothing
about the actual merits of the case, only about how accurately the judge will
be able to compute the true merits. It is worth stressing that there is nothing
inherently wrong with Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno’s approach. The approach
merely leaves the reader wondering whether their results apply to a world in
which the evidence that parties find serves the function of informing them of
the true merits. Given the Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno conceptualization, the
use of q is correct. The definition assesses the inaccuracy of the non-Bayesian
judge for any q, and one could consider developing measures of accuracy that
aggregate over hypothetical distributions of q. If one were to adopt the alterna-
tive conceptualization above, then the definition of true merits must be changed
from q to one that incorporates also the parties’ weighted z signals.
The definition of Et introduces its own complications. The definition is
complex, involving double integrals over both costs and the parties’ signals.
But the essence is that it is a measure of the expected outcome of a dispute,
taking into account both the settlements and the trials. The accounting for
settlements is unproblematic, but the outcome in the event of trial that they
calculate is represented by G, which “captures both the decision on the merits
and fee shifting.” For example, if the judgment is for 0.45 and the plaintiff pays
costs of 0.10 to the defendant, then G = 0.35. The inclusion of fee shifting costs
reflects that imposition of fee shifting not only affects settlement negotiations,
but also affects the amount that the plaintiff must pay to the defendant at trial.
There are, however, two arguable problems with using the expectation of G in
the event a case goes to trial as the measure of outcome accuracy.
Accounting for costs The first problem is that this measure ignores the
pre-fee shifting costs that the parties pay. Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno note
“that the plaintiff receives G − c2 and the defendant pays G +
c
2 .” Imagine a
case with very high costs and no fee shifting, where each party spends a mil-
lion dollars and the court arrives at precisely the correct conclusion that the
defendant owes the plaintiff 50 cents. From this definition’s perspective, this
outcome counts as a perfectly accurate result. That is a plausible definition of
accuracy, but one that offers no comfort to the parties. An alternative defini-
tion of accuracy would consider any amounts actually spent at trial, for example
counting the outcome from the plaintiff’s perspective as G− c2 . A similar defini-
tion could measure accuracy from the defendant’s perspective. Either of these
two approaches captures three distinct aspects of costs: (1) the costs impact
settlement negotiations; (2) when trial occurs, the costs are deadweight losses
to society at large; and (3) costs may reduce (or perhaps in some cases increase)
the accuracy of adjudication viewed as a black box from the perspective of each
individual litigant. The second consideration may produce activity-level effects
(e.g., one may not open a business in a litigious industry), while the third con-
sideration may produce primary conduct effects (e.g., a business might take
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excessive precautions to avoid injuries). Thus, while Dari-Mattiacci and Sara-
ceno’s measure may be interesting as an abstract inquiry into whether the court
system achieved the correct answer, it would also be useful to assess accuracy
by considering the total amount of money actually paid or received by each of
the parties, including costs and the judgment itself, relative to the amount that
would be paid in a hypothetical perfect judicial system. This change would im-
pose no demands on a computational model, which can calculate performance
statistics based on any definable metric.
Outcome expectation There is also an additional problem with the use
of Et as the measure of the outcome. The (in)accuracy measure focuses on
the expectation of settlement or trial results, rather than on the actual result in
particular cases. It is a comparison of the expectation of the result with the true
merits, not a measure of the error. If, for example, there are two scenarios in
which the correct result based on the true merits would be for the defendant to
pay the plaintiff 0.50, and in one scenario the defendant pays 0 and in the other
scenario the defendant pays 1, then this measure would count the legal system
as perfectly accurate. A counterargument would be that only the expected
judgment matters because, as discussed above, the parties are risk-neutral, and
risk-neutral parties would be indifferent between receiving perfectly accurate
results and results that are correct on average. Ideally, however, the definition
of accuracy would not be dependent on an assumption about risk neutrality.
An alternative definition would aggregate the distance between the actual
outcome and the ideal outcome in each case. In more technical terms, ide-
ally, instead of calculating a measure of inaccuracy that is a function of Et,
the authors might have calculated a measure of expected inaccuracy in which
the inaccuracy is calculated within each case rather than based on an average
across cases. Easier said than done, of course. This would require moving a
minus q term and a squared term within the double integrals in the current Et
definition. But improving on this aspect of the accuracy definition should be
straightforward for a computational model.
Squared vs. absolute value Finally, one might quibble about the use
of a squared term rather than an absolute value. It is conventional to measure
accuracy using the `2 norm rather than the `1 norm. The convention reflects
the dominance of ordinary least squares regression over least absolute deviation
regression, but that dominance stems as least in part from the greater tractabil-
ity of the former. Portnoy and Koenker (1997) [17] note that computational
power mitigates this advantage, and that an advantage of the `1 norm is that it
is more robust to outliers. Ultimately, the choice between them should depend
on some broader model of social welfare. For example, in a model like Hylton
(2002), disputes arise endogenously as a result of primary activity, such as de-
cisions to take care, allowing derivation of direct social welfare measures. One
might then compare hypothetical legal systems that perform differently on `1
and `2 measures of accuracy to determine which measure makes more sense in
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that legal context. That is beyond the scope of this paper, though endogenizing
disputes may be a fruitful direction for future research on computational mod-
els. In the meantime, a task for the computational models here is to be able to
switch between the norms.
2.4 Klerman, Lee, and Liu’s Correlated Signals Model
While Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno improve on the Friedman and Wittman
model by adding support for fee-shifting, which Friedman and Wittman did not
consider, Klerman, Lee, and Liu seek to improve the Friedman and Wittman
model’s usefulness in addressing an issue that Friedman and Wittman directly
considered: the distribution of tried cases given selection effects from settlement.
Recall that Friedman and Wittman found that with low costs, tried cases will
tend to be in the middle of the distribution, while with high costs, tried cases
will tend to be at the extremes of the distribution. This result may depend
on the structure of signals in the model, in particular the relationship between
the plaintiff’s and defendant’s signals, drawn from separate distributions. The
signals are correlated conditional on the judgment, because the judgment de-
rives from the signals, but the signals are unconditionally independent. What
Klerman, Lee, and Liu endeavour to accomplish is to model litigation with the
signals as functions of the true state, rather than the other way around. If the
true state of the world is that the plaintiff’s case is strong, both parties are
more likely to receive relatively strong signals than they would receive if the
true state is that the case is weak.
Before focusing on the structure of and assumptions in their model, it is
worth addressing which information structure is more realistic. The information
structure in Friedman and Wittman, continued as well in Dari-Mattiacci and
Saraceno, can be seen as one in which the parties have entirely independent
information, and this information is averaged to the judgment. It may seem
unrealistic that the parties do not have shared information, but this assumption
is without loss of generality. One can conceive of the plaintiff and defendant as
having much shared information, allowing them to narrow down the range of the
judgment. At least in the most general version of the Friedman and Wittman
model, the signals are from arbitrary cumulative distributions. Meanwhile, the
information structure in Klerman, Lee, and Liu may be seen as one in which the
parties have different beliefs based on essentially the same information. These
beliefs may themselves be a form of information. For example, the plaintiff may
have beliefs based on the analysis performed by the plaintiff’s lawyer, who could
reach a different conclusion based on the same facts from the defendant’s lawyer.
Or, the plaintiff and defendant may have different recollections of events. For
our purposes, we can consider the signals to be information, but informally,
the beliefs construct may provide a better intuition for why signals might be
correlated.
In assessing which information structure makes more sense, one might ask
two questions: (1) Does the case concern damages or liability? In a damages
case, it is more plausible to see each piece of evidence adding independently
16
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3709964
to the amount of money that the plaintiff can expect to receive. The pain
that the plaintiff experiences, the lost wages, the effect of the accident on the
plaintiff’s relationships with others: each of these can be seen as a separate form
of injury entitling the plaintiff to independent relief. If each of these pieces of
information is largely private until trial, then a model that treats the parties
as having independent information may well be acccurate. In a liability case,
however, the question is whether the evidence meets the decision standard, such
as preponderance of the evidence. As noted above, outcomes are thus highly
nonlinear in evidence. Thus, even if parties have separate evidence, it seems
unrealistic that the judgment would be equal simply to the sum of the values of
the evidence.
(2) Does the failure of bargaining mean litigation or trial? The literature
on settlement bargaining generally disregards pre-filing bargaining. Pre-filing
bargaining can be seen as reflecting similar logic to post-filing bargaining. If
no deal is reached pre-filing, then a litigation will result (with some average
outcome depending primarily on how long settlement negotiations drag on and
what the ultimate settlement is), while if no deal is reached post-filing, a trial
will result (with some average outcome depending on the decision of judge and
jury). Thus, the same general models apply, but the information structure may
be different. Shortly after the possibility of litigation becomes apparent, there
will be some shared information but also some independent information, and so
at least at very early stages, the information structure of Friedman and Wittman
may be closer. Discovery will tend to equalize the parties’ information, though
incompletely and leaving room for different beliefs about the information, so
after discovery, the information structure of Klerman, Lee, and Liu may be
more appropriate.
Ideally, one model might be embedded within the other, or a unifying model
might explicitly model the interactions among various pieces of information,
some of which are inherently common knowledge, some of which can be shared
easily, some of which can be partly shared through discovery, some of which can
never be shared, and some of which there might be varying levels of disagree-
ment about. A computational model may well be able to achieve that, though
it is beyond the scope of the current project. In the meantime, the fact that
different models may be appropriate for different situations highlights a limi-
tation of mathematical models that the computational modeling in this paper
may partially address. Different models are built to address different issues,
such as fee shifting for Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno and dispute selection for
Klerman, Lee, and Liu, but the modeling choices that they make for tractability
in addressing these issues may also have implications for information structure.
Thus, it is difficult to determine whether, for example, Dari-Mattiacci and Sara-
ceno’s fee shifting results would be the same in a correlated signals model. A
computational model will use a particular information structure, but it facili-
tates examination of a larger number of outcome variables. Similarly, Klerman,
Lee, and Liu assume the American rule, and it would be difficult to modify
their model to incorporate fee-shifting. (See Chang and Hubbard (2018) for
empirical evidence on the Priest-Klein model outside the United States.) In a
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computational model, this again becomes a trivial change, because it requires
only changing the code that determines the judgment at trial.
In part because they do not focus on fee-shifting and because they ignore the
possibility that there could be disputes about damages as well as about liability,
the model of Klerman, Lee, and Liu is admirably general. A random variable Y
(with realization y) determines the disputes merits. If y > 0, the plaintiff has
a probability θH of winning, and if y ≤ 0, the plaintiff’s win probability is θL,
where 0 ≤ θL ≤ θH ≤ 1. (Note that while θ was used to represent the signals in
the Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno model, it is used to represent win probabilities
here. Because this paper’s purpose is to point out how computational models
can enhance mathematical ones, rather than proposing its own grand unified
theory, the paper uses each paper’s notation in discussion of that paper.) The
Priest-Klein model has a similar setup but requires that θL = 0 and θH = 1.
The more significant improvement lies in the correlated signals, with plaintiff
receiving a signal yp from the distribution Yp = Y + εp, and the defendant,
yd from the distribution Yd = Y + εd, where the error terms are normally
distributed, i.e. εp, εd ∼ N(0, σ2). Each party is assumed to be a sophisticated
Bayesian who knows the distribution Y and of the other party’s signal based on
its own signal, though the analysis also allows litigants to be naive and construct
estimates as if the probability distribution were flat.
Klerman, Lee, and Liu include models in which the plaintiff makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to the defendant, where the defendant makes such an offer to the
plaintiff, and where the parties engage in Chatterjee-Samuelson bargaining. We
will focus on the last of these to make our analysis here as close to our analysis
above as possible and also because this approach, though stylized, seems a
more realistic reduction of an extended bargaining process than one with take-
it-or-leave-it offers. A computational model can easily switch between these
approaches; simultaneous offers can even be used to model take-it-or-leave-it
bargaining, for example if the code provides that a defendant’s offer will be
deemed accepted by the other plaintiff if the plaintiff’s submission is greater
than or equal to the offer. A more difficult challenge, which we defer to a later
paper, is bargaining over multiple rounds.
Another division in the Klerman, Lee, and Liu analysis allows for two differ-
ent approaches to modeling the distribution of cases. One approach is to model
the distribution, gY (x), as an improper uniform distribution over all real num-
bers, so that gY (x) = 1 for all x. Although gY (x) cannot then be considered a
probability density function, because it does not integrate to 1, Klerman, Lee,
and Liu are able to apply earlier literature on such distributions. A virtue of
mathematical models not easily available in computational ones is the ability to
play with mathematical abstractions involving infinity. A computational simu-
lation uses finite numbers and so it cannot engage this trick, though it can allow
for case quality to be distributed over an arbitrary finite range. For this reason,
we will focus on the portion of the Klerman, Lee, and Liu analysis in which they
assume that gY (x) is a continuous, strictly positive probability distribution.
Given such a distribution, Klerman, Lee, and Liu identify two types of equi-
libria. Both types of these equilibria are limit equilibria, in the sense that they
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are defined as σ → 0. This helps establish versions of the Priest-Klein 50% limit
hypothesis, namely that the plaintiff will win 50% of litigated cases regardless
of the distribution of meritorious cases overall. a hypothesis that applies only
in the limit as the parties’ error approaches zero. The first type of equilibrium
is a symmetric limit equilibrium. By symmetric, the authors mean that the
plaintiff’s offer given a signal x would be equal to the defendant’s offer given
a signal −x. They establish equilibrium in the usual way, by showing that the
plaintiff’s offer given its signal maximizes the plaintiff’s utility, and similarly
that the defendant’s offer given its signal minimizes a loss function. They show
that the plaintiff trial win rate in this equilibrium is θH+θL2 , confirming Priest-
Klein where θL = 0 and θH = 1. The plaintiff calculates a threshold, offering
0 below this threshold and θH + θL above; the defendant does the same thing,
with the negative of the same threshold function.
Klerman, Lee, and Liu also identify another pair of equilibria for each σ,
which they call obstinate limit equilibria. One features an obstinate plaintiff,
and one features an obstinate defendant. The obstinate plaintiff always sets
its offer at the same relatively high constant value given a particular σ, thus
screening the defendant, and the obstinate defendant does the opposite. The
Priest-Klein 50% limit hypothesis does not apply to these equilibria, except
in the coincidence of one of the win probability parameters being set to 50%
or obstinate plaintiff and obstinate defendant equilibria occurring in the right
proportions. The plaintiff trial win rate is θL, and the defendant trial win rate
is θH .
Thus, in both equilibria, the offer function for at least one party either is
entirely flat or consists of two flat segments with a jump discontinuity. This
presents a contrast with Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno. Although they also ac-
cepted the possibility of discontinuities, the Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno offer
functions include regions in which offers monotonically rise as a result of the
signal received. Klerman, Lee, and Liu do not prove that the equilibria they
identify are exclusive, however, so their model leaves open the possibility that
other equilibria exist that include monotonically increasing segments.
An assumption in the model that might seem problematic is that although
a continuous range of case types exist, there are only two possible probabilities
of plaintiff victory, θL and θH . The intuition that this is not a problem is that
the parties’ signals, Yp and Yd, can take on values across the real line, and thus
the expected value of the probability of victory can take on any value between
θL and θH . But the question remains whether the division of cases into two
types contributes to the derived equilibria in each of which a party’s offer takes
on either of two values rather than a continuous range.
Assessing whether this is true is important for assessment of the validity of
the Priest-Klein hypotheses, but also more broadly. If litigants really are inelas-
tic with respect to the signals they receive, except at a single jump discontinuity,
then one might worry that settlement outcomes will necessarily be highly in-
accurate. Thus, the Klerman, Lee, and Liu results invite questions about the
accuracy of litigation. That is a question that they do not directly address and
moreover that is difficult to address within the context of their model. After all,
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their model has no concept of a “correct answer.” Perhaps one could postulate
that perfect accuracy would be achieved if of all cases in which y > 0, the pro-
portion θH are resolved with the plaintiff winning, and similarly θL for y < 0,
but this begs the question of whether the proportion of plaintiffs who win are
those whom one would want to win. A model that began by designating some
cases as those in which the defendant is truly liable, distributing case strength
as a function of true merits, could address the concern.
The broader critique of the two case types limitation may seem not only
unfair (the proofs are quite demanding even with two types), but also ironic.
The computational models to be discussed in the next section are inherently
discrete models, allowing for only some finite, relatively small number of dis-
crete signals. Yet the critique makes two points. First, even many mathemati-
cal models that include continuous distributions also include discrete elements.
Thus, computational models should not necessarily be rejected for their own
(in)discretions. Second, and more importantly, computational models may help
relax discretizations in mathematical models. Instead of two case types, for
example, a computational model might allow three, four or five. Arguably, it
is better to have a handful of case types and a handful of signal types than to
have just two case types and an infinite range of signal types. The handfuls may
leave for the possibility of artificially imposed discontinuities, but at least they
can clarify whether binary outcomes in parties’ strategies stem from a model
limitation or arise as a fundamental aspect of the information and bargaining
setup.
The existence of only two case types improves the model’s tractability in
another way that highlights an important assumption. Klerman, Lee, and Liu
assume that θL ≥ Cp and θH ≤ 1 − Cd, where Cp and Cd represents the
plaintiff’s and defendant’s costs, respectively. The reason for this assumption
is that it guarantees that a plaintiff will always have a credible threat to take a
lawsuit to trial, and the defendant will always have a credible threat to defend.
Thus, they do not need to worry about whether a plaintiff either might not
file a case in the first place or might abandon a case after settlement fails, and
similarly about whether a defendant might default, either immediately or after
bargaining failure. Of course, with a range of case types, they might similarly
assume that even with the extreme case types, it will be in the interest of both
litigants to proceed. But this assumption becomes increasingly implausible if
the most extreme case types have sufficiently low and high probability, as for
example in the original Priest-Klein model where θL = 0 and θH = 1. The
authors justify their assumption by noting that allowing parties not to take a
case to trial “would further complicate the model and would distract from the
key point of the analysis here, which is selection, not nuisance suits.” (p. 393
n.10) That is reasonable, but a computational model might allow for assessing
whether the possibility of noncredible threats might affect selection rates at
trial. If, for example, plaintiffs with low-quality cases drop out after bargaining
failure, that might increase the win rate of plaintiffs in the cases that remain.
An additional simplification in the model that may be of concern is the
assumption that damages are fixed. There may well be many cases in which
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damages are more or less known and liability is unknown, but there are also
cases in which both liability and damages are contested. One might have the
intuition that this should not matter because each party, focusing on the liabil-
ity question, calculates the expected damages, making appropriate adjustments
for risk aversion. On the other hand, if there is two-sided asymmetric infor-
mation about both damages and liability, bargaining failure could result from
disagreement about damages, disagreement about liability, or both, and so a
prediction of 50% victory does not mean a 50% win rate on liability. There are
effectively two ways for the defendant to win, but the win rate applies to only
one of them. Klerman, Lee, and Liu’s project, in conjunction with Klerman and
Lee (2016), is to place Priest-Klein on sounder Bayesian footing, and at that
they succeed spectacularly, but a computational model may help flesh out the
further implications of correlated signals.
3 Computationally Modeling Two-Sided
Asymmetric Information
This section is designed more as primer than as critique. The challenge, given
the models reviewed in the previous section, is to determine to what extent
discrete computational models can mimic the mathematical models, producing
similar Bayesian equilibria, and how computational models might be able to
relax some assumptions. At the same time, it is important to highlight aspects of
the existing models that the computational models cannot easily replicate. The
section uses distinct modeling techniques for each of the three articles presented
in the prior section. This is not because one modeling technique happens to
be the appropriate one to use for the particular mathematical model. To the
contrary, the last and most sophisticated of the techniques, counterfactual regret
minimization, could easily be applied to all three problems, and the other two
techniques could also be applied to all three, albeit with more constraints on the
players’ strategies than would be ideal. Indeed, one of the great virtues of the
computational approach is that one can use the same algorithmic game theory
techniques (indeed, even the same code base, such as the open source code used
for this paper) to model many different games.
The organization reflects the pedagogical goal of providing some intuition
for the different methods. The simplest, but least efficient, technique for find-
ing Nash equilibria is simply to enumerate all of the plaintiff’s and all of the
defendant’s possible strategies and then to examine each pair of strategies to
determine if it is a Nash equilibrium. The algorithm is the familiar iterated
elimination of dominated alternatives that game theory students learn in the
first week or so of class. We start with this section at some peril; the technique
is both widely known and of limited power. But the discussion highlights two
points. First, the settlement bargaining literature has heretofore ignored the
possibility of employing a technique with which virtually everyone writing in
the literature is familiar, yet the approach makes it easy to derive interesting
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results or extensions. Second, with this technique, the atomic unit of decision
is a litigant’s strategy writ large. That is, a single strategy specifies what the
litigant will do in all circumstances.
The more advanced techniques succeed by using smaller atomic units. With
the technique of “no regret” learning, the atomic unit can be considered to be
information provided to a litigant by what the game theory literature refers to
as Nature or Chance. For example, in litigation, this information could consist
of one or more signals of the litigation’s value that each litigant receives at the
beginning of the game. The approach allows the litigant to treat the problem
of determining appropriate responses independently for each information result
provided by Chance. A litigant applying the “no regret” learning techniques
need not worry about the consistency of the parties’ own decisionmaking at
different states of nature, or more importantly, even about how the litigant’s
adversary might react to the evolution in the party’s strategy. Because each in-
formation condition is treated separately, “no regret” learning avoids the expo-
nential blowup in number of strategies with iteration of dominated alternatives
that occurs when complexity increases.
The final technique, counterfactual regret minimization, narrows the atomic
unit to a specific information set, including not only the information provided
by Chance, but also information learned in the course of the game as a result
of the other parties’ moves. For example, bargaining may proceed over multiple
rounds, with litigants in later rounds accounting for information such as the
offers made by opponents in early rounds. Similarly, after bargaining fails, a
litigant may decide whether to concede the case rather than go to trial in part
based on the offers made. Counterfactual regret minimization structures learn-
ing among related decisions, so that each party’s strategy at each information
set is informed by updated distributions of variables unknown to that party
given that the information set is reached.
3.1 Iterative Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
We will begin by developing a computational model using the Friedman and
Wittman setup, though the same approach can be applied easily to either of
the other two articles. The approach is to enumerate a list of many possible
strategies for each player and then systematically search for a Nash equilibrium
by considering each pair of opponent strategies. The goal of this analysis is not
to persuade the reader that this is the best way to implement a computational
model or that this approach is better than the one that Friedman and Wittman
develop. Indeed, the goal is in part to show how constrained this approach is,
because allowing for greater strategic complexity makes the process unwieldy.
At the same time, however, the approach is very easily implemented and it
allows for great flexibility in modifying some aspects of the game. In particular,
it allows, at no additional cost of computational complexity, for any modification
to the game affecting the parties’ utility payouts.
How can we enumerate the strategies? Recall that each player must an-
nounce a proposed offer given a signal received of the strength of the plaintiff’s
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case. Thus, we might constrain the parties’ strategies by requiring each player
to submit a strategy in the form of a linear function. To reduce further the num-
ber of strategies, we can restrict the strategies to nondecreasing lines, and we
can require that each line either intersect or be tangent to a square with corners
at (0,0) and (1,1). The bottom of this square represents the axis for the parties’
θ signals, and the left of the square represents the axis for the parties’ offers,
which we label the o-axis. The height of the line at the left of the box thus
represents the offer that a party will give for the lowest possible signal, and the
right of the box, the offer for the highest possible signal. Let nendpoints represent
the number of available endpoints and nangles represent the number of angles.
Figure 1 illustrates available strategies if nendpoints = 10 and nangles = 10. The
simulations that follow use nendpoints = 50 and nangles = 50, thus 25 times as






Figure 1: A fraction of the available strategies
The strategy matrix thus includes n2endpointsn
2
angles entries, or in each of our
simulations, 6,250,000. We arbitrarily designate the plaintiff as row player (so
that the plaintiff plays the same strategy in any given row of the matrix) and the
defendant as column player. For each entry in the matrix, we must approximate
the parties’ utility, which is accomplished by taking permutations of nsignals for
each of the plaintiff and defendant, where the signals are drawn evenly from
the unit uniform distribution. Thus, for each matrix entry, the game results
must be calculated n2signals times, with each game result calculating the plain-
tiff’s and defendant’s strategies given their offers, determining whether the case
settles or not, and applying the game rules to determine utility. Our simulations
used nsignals = 100, so the total number of game plays for each simulation was
62,500,000,000. With this strategy matrix calculated, the algorithm for iterative
elimination of strictly dominated strategies may be applied.
The algorithm is straightforward: For each row, identify the column in which
the defendant earns the highest utility. Likewise, for each column, identify the
row in which the plaintiff earns the highest utility. For every cell in the matrix,
if the defendant’s utility is lower than the maximum defendant’s utility in the
row or if the plaintiff’s utility is lower than the maximum plaintiff’s utility in
the column, then mark that cell as permanently eliminated. This reflects that
a strategy is a Nash equilibrium if and only if neither player would change
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strategies given the other’s choice of strategies. Repeat this entire process for
as many times as leads to further elimination of matrix entries. Once there is
a pass in which no further entries are eliminated, the process is complete, and
the remaining matrix entries represent Nash equilibrium strategies in the game,
given the constraint that strategies must be linear and given the discretization
of only considering a finite number of possible lines.
This process is not guaranteed to find a unique Nash equilibrium. It may
find many Nash equilibria. This may occur either because the underlying game
with continuous signals features multiple equilibria or because the discretization
introduces multiple equilibria, which may for example be clustered in some
portion of the matrix, none corresponding perfectly to a pure equilibrium in
the corresponding nondiscretized game. Ideally, one would analyze all multiple
equilibria that arise and describe the family of Nash equilibria. Our approach
is simply to choose the Nash equilibrium that minimizes the square distance
between the parties’ utilities; this is admittedly arbitrary, but it tends to produce
more symmetric equilibria and thus may be easier to interpret. One implication
is that where any settlement between 0 and 1 would be a Nash equilibrium,
as is the case if the cost of trial is sufficiently high, the equilibrium selected
will be one in which each litigant receives 12 . This is thus consistent with the
approach in the Landes-Posner-Gould framework of assuming that parties share
the surplus from settlement, but it still leaves open the possibility of trial even
where the social surplus from settlement is positive.
Iterative elimination of dominated strategies also may not find any Nash
equilibria. Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist only in mixed strategies, and
even where a Nash equilibrium exists in a game with continuous signals and
infinitely many lines, it may not exist in the discrete game. In this case, the
combination of strategies closest to equilibrium was selected. Distance from
equilibrium is measured as the sum of the square of the utility gain that the
plaintiff could obtain from switching rows and the square of the utility gain that
the defendant could obtain from switching columns.
The results are illustrated in Figure 2. Each box represents a different sim-
ulation, corresponding to a different level of costs c. In fact, the simulation
for each box did find at least one equilibrium. The blue lines with square
marks represent the plaintiffs’ offers; the orange lines with no marks represent
the defendants’ offers. The dashed lines represent the lines that Friedman and
Wittman identified as furnishing equilibria. On one hand, the solid and dashed
lines reflect a similar phenomenon that accords with common sense. As costs
rise, plaintiffs become more generous by lowering the amount that they demand
for any given signal and defendants become more generous by raising the amount
that they offer for any given signal. At some point, costs are high enough that
the defendant’s offer line will be higher than the plaintiff’s offer line. When
this first occurs, some cases may still go to trial, but only when the plaintiff’s
signal is sufficiently higher than defendant’s. In the last panel, the minimum
defendant offer is greater than the maximum plaintiff offer given the Friedman
and Wittman calculations, a situation in which the truncated lines would be
undefined. In the same panel, the computational model produces a Nash equi-
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librium in which the plaintiff and defendant always settle at a constant value of
1
2 to avoid the oppressive risk of litigation; recall that this is the result of the
equilibrium refinement.






















Figure 2: Equilibrium offers for different costs
On the other hand, the differences between the Friedman-Wittman lines and
the computational models’ equilibria are stark. Plaintiffs’ offers are consider-
ably more elastic with respect to costs in the Friedman-Wittman formulation
than in the computational model. Note that in the third panel, where c = 0.2,
the computational model has the plaintiff’s offer line above the defendant’s,
but the reverse is true in the Friedman-Wittman model. What accounts for
this? The answer is simple. The computational model does not include the
Friedman-Wittman truncations. This highlights that the truncations are not
mere mathematical conveniences but in fact are central to identifying the rele-
vant equilibria.
It might appear that it would be straightforward to modify the computa-
tional model to mimic the truncations. After all, in the Friedman-Wittman
equilibrium, each litigant’s line is always truncated based on the litigant’s op-
ponent’s line. Thus, we can modify the simulation so that the game outcome
is calculated based on the truncated version of each line. The only truncations
that affect the outcome in the Friedman and Wittman model are the plaintiff’s
lower truncation and the defendant’s upper truncation, where the defendant’s
offer is higher than the plaintiff’s, because the other truncations designate re-
gions in which the parties go to trial anyway. Figure 3 illustrates the results.
In the case where the truncations are undefined, we use the midpoint of the
defendant’s minimum strategy and the lower plaintiff’s maximum strategy.






















Figure 3: Equilibrium offers for different costs, with truncations
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Why do the results still not match up with those of Friedman and Wittman?
The answer is that the truncations are central to the Nash equilibrium. When
the plaintiff truncates its offers, ensuring that it never offers an amount be-
low what the defendant is offering, it not only improves its utility against that
particular defendant strategy at the defendant’s expense, but also may affect
utilities as against other strategies. In other words, a strategy in Friedman and
Wittman represents a schedule of offers for particular signals, not the combi-
nation of such a schedule with a promise to truncate offers based on whichever
opponent happens to come along. The computational model thus highlights that
the truncations of Friedman and Wittman are not simply maneuvers to make
their mathematical analysis tractable but are in fact central to the equilibria
they develop.
The computational model thus might seem quite disappointing, this section
serving as the equivalent of Elon Musk’s demonstration of his truck’s unbreak-
able glass that resulted in the glass shattering. That is a reasonable reaction.
It’s worth noting, though, that the problem is potentially fixable. One could
define a universe of strategies consisting not simply of a start point and an
angle, but also containing a truncation distance. The plaintiff’s truncation dis-
tance, if nonzero, would indicate the point at which the plaintiff’s offers start
increasing from the plaintiff’s minimum to maximum value, and the defendant’s
truncation distance, where the defendant’s offers reach their maximum and no
longer increase. This exercise, however, will be left to the reader. The real
payoff of the paper will come with the more advanced models of later sections,
and these models do not include linearity constraints. Moreover, the example
highlights the primary practical difficulty with use of iterative elimination of
dominated strategies. The utilities matrix grows with the square of the number
of strategies. Thus, if each player’s strategy were allowed to incorporate one
of 50 truncation values, in addition to the existing endpoint and angle values,
the matrix would be 2500 times as large. And a truncated line is still a fairly
simple strategy. A quadratic or cubic strategy, or a strategy that is a function
of multiple variables, will be cumbersome to enumerate.
Still, one should not leave with the conclusion that this tool is worthless.
Many models include linearity constraints; recall that Dari-Mattiacci and Sara-
ceno’s model incorporates piecewise linearity constraints. One may still be able
to learn something with a settlement bargaining model in which each party’s
settlement is constrained to a line. The Friedman and Wittman model is ob-
viously superior to this model as applied to the exact same problem; a proof
that identifies each party’s strategy is much more useful than an algorithm that
approximates it. But the algorithm has a benefit of greater flexibility. Earlier,
for example, this article promised that it would be trivial for a computational
model to incorporate risk aversion. We won’t waste space by making good on
every such promise, but let’s make good on that one. Figure 4 adds a fourth
dimension to the three dimensional graph in Figure 2.
The RA axis in Figure 4 adjusts for risk aversion. Each party’s utility u′
is redefined as a function of its risk neutral utility u, according to the formula
u′ = ln(24−RA + u). The result may look repetitive, but that is itself a bit
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Figure 4: Equilibrium offers, based on cost and risk aversion
surprising. At least in this model, risk aversion does not have much effect on
the parties’ bargaining. The computational model also makes it straightforward
to change the parties’ levels of risk aversion independently, and we can examine
aggregate statistics under each equilibrium. Figure 5 plots in each mini-graph
a measure of accuracy (specifically, the absolute difference between the amount
the plaintiff received and the amount the plaintiff would receive if trial costs
were zero and all cases went to trial) with a solid blue line, as well as the trial
rate with a dashed orange line. What makes the results exciting is that they
are even more boring than those in Figure 4. Squinting, one can see that trial
rates are ever so slightly lower when the plaintiff and the defendant have the
same level of risk aversion (along the panels diagonally from the bottom left
to the top right). But the central message is that even significant levels of risk
aversion have very little effect on variables like trial rates. Once both parties are
shading their bids in an effort to maximize individual surplus, the benefits that
27
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3709964
would accrue to a risk-averse litigant from being less aggressive do not seem to















































































































Figure 5: Accuracy and trial rates as a function of costs and risk aversion
We will make good also on the promise that the computational model can
easily incorporate an offer-of-settlement rule. Figure 6 does this. The F axis
represents a parameter determining the strength of the offer-of-settlement rule.
When a case goes to trial, the plaintiff must pay the defendant an amount pro-
portional to the difference in the parties’ aggressiveness relative to the judgment,
i.e. F{(oP − J) − (J − oD)} = F (oP + oD − 2J). This figure also includes
a dotted red line indicating the trial rate (using the same scale as the vertical
axis).
As the figure demonstrates, the offer-of-settlement rule leads to considerably
less aggressive offers by the parties, increasing settlement for any particular level
of costs. There are decreasing returns from the final offer rule, however, as most
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Figure 6: Equilibrium offers with offer-of-settlement rules
of the trial rate reduction arises in raising F from 0 to 0.25. Of course, to tell a
more complete story about offer-of-settlement rules, one would want to look at
more variables. Ideally, moreover, one would like to lift the linearity constraint
or add additional complexity to the parties’ strategies, for example by giving
the parties options to concede rather than face trial. This paper’s primary aims
are methodological, so we will return to these methodological challenges but
will not comment further here on offer-of-settlement rules.
3.2 No Regret Learning
The principal problem with the technique employed in the prior section is that
it constrained the parties’ strategies to being linear, and that constraint could
be relaxed only with an exponential blowup in the strategies matrix. Preferable
would be a technique that required enumeration of moves in discrete situations,
but that allowed each move to be optimized separately from all of the other
moves. For example, one might enumerate all of the offers that a defendant can
make when confronted with the signal 0.30 and, separately, all the offers when
confronted with 0.35 and so forth. The technique that we will use to accomplish
this is “no regret” learning. See Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006) [3].
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Focus first on just one decision that a player faces, such as the decision
that the defendant faces when confronted with the signal 0.30. Even with no
knowledge of the litigation game, the defendant can learn a strategy if the
defendant plays repeatedly at time steps t ∈ 1, 2, ..., T . At each time step t,
let a ∈ A∆ represent an action that the defendant may select. The defendant’s
task is to assign a probability weight for each action. In effect, the defendant
rewinds time and tries each action every time to learn what the utility for each
action would have been. Define the defendant’s external regret for not taking
a as rta = U
t
a − U t, where U t is the utility the defendant in fact received and
U ta is the utility that the defendant would have received had the defendant
chosen a with probability 1. Note that a positive value for regret means that
the corresponding action is a relatively good one; the defendant is regretful for
not having taken it with higher probability. When the regret is zero, the player
either did choose a with probability 1 or chose some other action or combination
of actions that happened to produce the same average utility. Finally, where
regret is negative, that means that the player is pleased to have not chosen a
with higher probability.





(U ta − U t) (2)
The accumulated external regret represents the maximum sum of external re-
grets over all iterations for a single strategy a, that is, the sum of the maximum
regrets that the player would have received if the player had played the same
action in every iteration, assuming that the plaintiff played the same actions
that the plaintiff in fact played. Critically, this is not the same as the sum of
the maximum utility that the defendant could have earned in each iteration,
by choosing the best action in each iteration given what the plaintiff in fact
played. We can then define the average regret as R̄t = R
t
t . If the defendant
plays a strategy that ensures that limt→∞ R̄
t = 0, then external regret is said
to be minimized. The “no regret” learning literature identifies algorithms that
adjust the player’s mixed strategy based on the accumulated external regrets
and that succeed in minimizing regret. A critical point is that these algorithms
are guaranteed to work even against hostile adversaries, for example against an
adversary who observes the defendant’s style of play and then seeks to counter
it. This is possible because regret minimization requires only that the average
regret approach zero, not the expected regret. Thus, the algorithms may recom-
mend that the defendant mix strategies against the plaintiff. The algorithm’s
goal at each iteration t is to choose an action a that minimizes accumulated ex-
ternal regret for all iterations up to and including t, not necessarily in iteration
t.
Among the most popular of the “no regret” algorithms is “regret matching.”
See Hart and Mas-Collel (2000). This algorithm chooses among the actions that
have positive external regrets in proportion to those positive external regrets,
and it eschews all actions with zero or negative regret. Formally, let Rt,+ =
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The Blackwell approachability theorem can be used to show that regret match-
ing is sublinear in time and thus meets the requirements of being a “no regret”
algorithm.
All of this analysis applies not only to the defendant, but also to the plaintiff.
Thus, plaintiff and defendant may play adversarially, each selecting a single
mixed strategy at any given iteration. The regrets that each player calculates
for each action are then based on the opponent’s mixed strategy at that iteration,
i.e. determining the utility that the player receives at t for a as the weighted
average of the utilities that the player would receive for each action the opponent
might play, weighed by the probabilities the opponent chose for that iteration.
Of course, the analysis applies to each and every decision that each player must
make. Just as the defendant need not worry that the plaintiff is adversarial
(and vice-versa), so too need the defendant not worry about coordinating the
defendant’s own strategies in two different situations, such as the strategies to
be played when the signal is 0.30 and when the signal is 0.35. In effect, the
defendant can assign a separate employee to tally the regrets for each of those
separate decisions. So long as each employee learns the regrets that arise from
playing each action, the employee need not worry what the other employees are
choosing to do in the same iteration for different decisions.
The procedure that we will follow is thus simple. We will repeatedly, over
1,000 iterations, play the “no regret” learning game separately for each discrete
strategy signal that the plaintiff or the defendant may receive. Does this guaran-
tee that the mixed strategies played in the last iteration will be close to a Nash
equilibrium? No, it does not. The only guarantees in a general sum game like
those explored here stem directly from the guarantees of “no regret” learning.
Regret minimization implies, for a particular decision optimization, that for any
ε > 0, there will exist a T0 such that for every t > T0, the accumulated exter-
nal regrets will be within ε of the best possible fixed strategy. Aggregating this
principle over all the decisions optimized by a player implies that there will exist
a T1 such that for every t > T1, the sum of the accumulated external regrets for
all of the player’s decisions will be within ε of the best possible fixed strategy,
where a strategy now dictates a probability distribution for every decision being
optimized.
This in turn implies that for t > T1, the set of actions played by the parties
in each iteration up to that point form an ε-coarse correlated equilibrium. When
there exists a coarse correlated equilibrium of T1 strategy sets (corresponding
to the strategies of all players), if a centralized agent were to choose a strategy
set, thus dictating a strategy for each player, then a player who believes that
other players will follow the centralized agent’s instructions will be at least as
well off committing to follow the centralized agent’s instructions (not knowing
which strategy set will be chosen) than choosing any other strategy. In an
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ε-coarse correlated equilibrium (a concept that we will formalize in the next
section), a player can gain no more than ε from choosing some strategy rather
than committing to follow the one recommended by the centralized agent. This
equilibrium concept is far weaker than that of Nash equilibrium. Note that it
is weaker even that the concept of an ε-correlated equilibrium, in which each
player will agree to the centralized agent’s instructions even after hearing which
strategy is played.
Still, the “no regret” algorithm may perform better on some tasks than the
ε-coarse correlated equilibrium guarantee promises. After all, while plaintiffs
and defendants are adversaries, if each is employing no regret learning simulta-
neously, neither is actively seeking to take advantage of the patterns that the
other is employing. It is possible that as the defendant gradually converges to
a strategy, the actions of the plaintiff that contributed to that convergence will
be at least as much in the interests of the plaintiff as before. If the parties
do converge on a Nash equilibrium, they may well continue to play the Nash
equilibrium strategy. Indeed, one of the primary goals of this paper is to demon-
strate that at least for some models of litigation games, “no regret” learning (as
well as the more detailed counterfactual regret minimization algorithm to be
described in the next section) does converge to Nash equilibria. It remains pos-
sible, of course, that different choices in modeling litigation might prevent a
Nash equilibrium from being attained. Further work beyond this paper may
help clarify the types of settlement bargaining modeling decisions that will lead
to Nash equilibria, or to very strong approximate Nash equilibria with very low
benefits from switching strategies.
To demonstrate this empirically, we return to the model offered by Dari-
Mattiacci and Saraceno. We will start with a version that relaxes three of their
assumptions. First, using no regret learning will inherently relax the assumption
of piecewise linearity. Second, we will allow for the full range of values of q,
representing the true merits and also the degree of information asymmetry.
And third, we will allow for costs beyond the level where an equilibrium would
be defined, stretching the costs axis all the way to 0.6 per party. We will execute
separate simulations for various permutations of q, c, and t.
If at the end of the simulation, the learning algorithm dictates that an action
be played with greater than a 0.995 probability, we round this up, on the theory
that the algorithm may be converging to playing that strategy with certainty.
This is admittedly an ad hoc maneuver, but empirically, this improved perfor-
mance. With such rounding, in each simulation, the results converged strongly
to a Nash equilibrium. A best response function (to be discussed in the next
section) was used to measure the maximum amount that a party could gain from
switching strategies, and the amounts were generally in the range of 1.0×10−17
to 1.0 × 10−15, essentially an accumulation of rounding errors in double preci-
sion numbers. In other words, a party could gain no more than a quadrillionth
of the amount at stake by changing strategies. That the technique effectively
identified an exact equilibrium here and also in the remaining games described
in this section does not guarantee that it will do so with alternative means of
modeling litigation, but there is also no guarantee that any particular proof
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technique will succeed at finding an equilibrium. This finding establishes the
central thesis of this paper, that computational models can at least sometimes
identify Bayesian equilibria in settlement bargaining models.
The offers generated with this approach are illustrated in Figures 7-8. There
is no reason to squint this time, as all one needs to appreciate is the overall shape
of the curves. There are three graphs this time because the Dari-Mattiacci and
Saraceno model results in different offer functions with different values of q.
Thus, the graphs include a middling value of q (0.4), an extreme value of q
(1.0), and a combination averaging the results of all q ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0}.
In each of the three panels, the large horizontal axis represents costs, and the
vertical access represents the fee shifting threshold t, with the English rule in
the top row and the American rule in the bottom row. The blue line (in all
cases here, the top line) is the plaintiff’s offer curve, and the orange line is
the defendant’s offer curve. (For those unable to see the color, the defendant’s
line is always below the plaintiff’s.) Note that in the middle panel, only the
plaintiff’s strategies are shown, because the defendant’s signal has no bearing










































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: All q
Focusing on the left two panels, the results suggest that although piecewise
linearity was a constraint in their original model, even with the restriction re-
moved, strategies that are more-or-less piecewise linear often result. Indeed, it
is striking that for any particular value of q, the offer curves include long flat
sections (placing aside the leftmost column in each panel, where there are many
Nash equilibria, as all cases go to trial with zero costs). The higher the costs, the
longer the flat sections. This calculation of optimal offers thus provides general
support for the proposition that the Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno equilibria may
be reasonably close to the equilibria that obtain in the absence of a piecewise
linearity assumption.
The “no regret” learning technique can also be used to generalize the Dari-
Mattiacci and Saraceno model along the lines described above. Let us change
the judgment J as follows: J = αQq
′+ (1−αQ)zN , where q′ = αΠzΠ +α∆z∆ +
αΠ,∆zΠ,∆, where αΠ + α∆ + αΠ,∆ = 1 and where zΠ, z∆, zΠ,∆, zN ∼ U . In
this formula q′ replaces q as a definition of the true merits, the sum of three
components, one resulting from the plaintiff’s private information, one from the
defendant’s private information, and one from information shared between the
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parties (formerly labeled q). Recall that in the original model, the parties know
the true merits, and their signals provide them no evidence of the true merits.
This generalization also allows for different degrees of information asymmetry,
while decoupling information asymmetry from the true merits. Meanwhile, the
zN random variable represents random noise that is truly independent of the true
merits. Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno highlight that their model reflects an anti-
winner bias, as the randomness in the component of the judgment attributable
to the parties’ normalized signals will on average regress judgments to the mean,
and this noise term, of variable size, can serve a similar function.
We also generalize the fee-shifting rule. Let FSΠ = (αΠ,∆zΠ,∆+αΠzΠ)/(αΠ,∆+
αΠ), where αΠ,∆ + αΠ > 0. This thus provides, consistent with Dari-Mattiacci
and Saraceno’s model, a measure of the quality of the plaintiff’s evidence, and
the plaintiff’s fees will be shifted to the defendant for a given fee-shifting thresh-
old t when J > 12 and FSΠ > 1− t. We can define FS∆ analogously to consider
the parties’ shared evidence and the defendant’s unique evidence, and fees will
be shifted to the plaintiff when J < 12 and FS∆ < t. We will use this definition
in this paper, though the computational model also supports calculating fee
shifting in other ways, such as based on the margin of victory.
With this approach, we can assess whether Dari-Mattiacci and Saraceno’s
findings on accuracy generalize. Rather than offer plots illustrating accuracy
immediately, we will make the ultimate charts more comprehensible by offering
a series of charts. We will start by showing how the parties’ utilities change in
an alteration of the model in which all cases go to trial because settlement is
disallowed. This can help make sense of the parties’ offer functions, and that
in turn can help clarify how trial rates vary at different parts of the continuum
of true merits cases. From there, it is a short step to assessing accuracy. This
journey thus analyzes the selection of disputes as part of its findings of accuracy,
thus uniting concerns that ordinarily would require an entirely separate model.
Except where stated otherwise, we will use αQ = 0.75, so that a quarter of the
judgment will be the result of pure noise; αΠ,∆ = 0.5, so that half of the total
information is shared; and αΠ = α∆ = 0.25, so that asymmetric information
does not systematically favor either party.
Figures 10-12 show the utility that parties will receive when trial is guaran-
teed. On the left panel, note that there are kinks in the utility functions only
where t = 0.5. At zΠ,∆ = 0.4, fee shifting will never occur when t = 0 or even
t = 0.25 (because the highest possible value of FSΠ is then 0.6, which is less
than 0.75). Fee shifting can occur when t = 0.5 if zΠ ≥ 0.7, and this is where
the plaintiff’s offer curve is kinked. Fee shifting will always occur at t = 0.75
and t = 1, so there are no kinks in any other row. Similar reasoning shows
why there are kinks only at t = 0.25 in the middle panel when the parties’
shared information is as good as possible for the plaintiff, and the right panel
combining results where zΠ,∆ ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} includes wavy lines that
partially smooth out various kinks. In each panel, the primary effect of trial
cost is to reduce parties’ utilities; with high fee shifting, it is the party that has
the weaker case whose utility rapidly declines, as this party can expect to bear
the brunt of the trial cost.
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Figure 12: U ; all zΠ,∆
Consider now Figures 13-15, which illustrate the parties offers as a function
of their signals, much as Figures 7-9 did for the original Dari-Mattiacci and
Saraceno model. In each mini-graph, the plaintiff’s offer curve (in blue) is either
over or overlapping the defendant’s. As in the original model, in the left column
of each panel, where trial is costless, all cases go to trial and thus the particular
offer functions are essentially arbitrary. With c = 0.15, there are dramatic
jump discontinuities. In the left panel, for low fee shifting, the jump occurs for
the plaintiff only where the plaintiff receives a very strong signal, but with fee
shifting, both parties’ offers jump where private information suggests that the
plaintiff may be able to overcome the deficit indicated by the shared information,
thus leading to the possibility of fee shifting to the plaintiff or at least a reduced
possibility of fee shifting to the defendant. In the middle panel, where the shared
information is all in the plaintiff’s favor, there are still discontinuities, but not
all in the middle of the probability spectrum. Meanwhile, with high costs,
the flat portions of the offer curves dominate and overlap. Where the shared
information is all in the plaintiff’s favor and c ≥ 0.3, each graph represents a
pooling equilibrium, because avoiding trial is in the parties’ mutual interest and
the risk from placing too much weight on private information when the direction
of any fee shifting is fairly clear becomes great. Higher fee shifting in these cases
simply shifts up the offer curves, and where fee shifting and costs are maximal,
the defendant always concedes full liability. When we combine a range of zΠ,∆
values in the right panel, we see each party with a region of poor signals in which
the party’s offer is flat (effectively screening on the other party’s type), and a
region of strong signals in which higher signals make the party more aggressive.
Fee shifting tends to make this region of ascending signals longer, at least if
costs are relatively low. For each level of fee shifting, high costs tend to reduce
the impact of the signal, flattening the offer curves.
Given these offers, the data on trial rates, represented by Dari-Mattiacchi
and Saraceno’s notation L, are unsurprising. Figures 16-18 show trial rates given
both the plaintiff’s (blue) and the defendant’s (orange) signals. In regions where
plaintiff offers increase, trial rates increase as well, and where defendant offers
increase, trial rates fall. Some of the changes in trial rates are very steep. As
the plaintiff becomes sufficiently confident that it will benefit from fee shifting,
the plaintiff becomes willing to accept a much higher rate of trial than in the
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Figure 15: o; all zΠ,∆
absence of fee shifting. With very high costs, however, trial is relatively rare,











































































































































































































































































































































Figure 18: L; all zΠ,∆
In turn, Figures 16-18 enable understanding of Figures 19-21. In these latter
figures, the horizontal axis in each mini-graph represents q′, the true merits of
the case. For any particular value of q, the true merits may only be defined
over a narrow region; if, for example, zΠ,∆ = 1.0, then q
′ ≥ 0.50. The overall
selection pattern here is quite complex, with considerable changes in shape
based on changes in q, c, and t. But an examination of the corresponding figure
for trial rates makes each individual pattern comprehensible. For example,
consider for the left panel the mini-graph with c = 0.15 and t = 1. This dip
in trial rates corresponds to the signal region where the trial rates fall, which
correspond to the region in Figure 13 where the parties’ offers rise steeply.
Focusing on the rightmost panel, these results suggest that a wide variety of
selection patterns are possible, including the familiar Priest-Klein pattern in
which the cases that go to trial are clustered in the middle of the true merits
spectrum, the competing pattern predicted by Bebchuk in which extreme cases
go to trial, and also bimodal patterns in which there are either two valleys or
two hills defining the trial rate. Consistent with Friedman and Wittman, there
appears to be a tipping point based on the level of costs.
Finally, we can now consider some measures of inaccuracy. Figures 22-24
plot in each minigraph the level of inaccuracy against the true merits. Two
36










































































































































































































































































































































Figure 21: L(q′); all zΠ,∆
measures of inaccuracy are used, one from the perspective of the plaintiff and
one from the perspective of the defendant. Thus, AΠ = |q′ − UΠ|, the absolute
difference between the true merits and the net amount the plaintiff recovers,
and similarly, A∆ = |1 − q′ − U∆| . Lower curves thus correspond to greater
accuracy. As before, the large horizontal axis is for costs, and the large vertical
axis is for fee shifting. Once again, blue is for the plaintiff and orange is for the
defendant, but the curves are heavily overlapping in any event. Once again, the
previous diagrams can help make sense of these. For example, consider the panel
for zΠ,∆ = 0.4, c = 0.45, and t = 0.5. Note the anomaly that the defendant’s
inaccuracy increases rapidly as q′ becomes sufficiently high, while the plaintiff’s
inaccuracy shrinks in the same region. This is because there is a point at which
the plaintiff’s signal becomes high enough that the plaintiff’s offer spikes (in the
corresponding mini-graph of Figure 13), causing trial rates to go from 0 to 1
(in the corresponding mini-graphs of Figure 16 and 19). The plaintiff performs
well enough so that fee shifting will generally occur, in turn placing the burden










































































































































































































































































































































Figure 24: A; all zΠ,∆
In this generalization of the model with revised definitions of accuracy, Dari-
Mattiacci and Saraceno’s accuracy claims still retain some of their power, though
the pattern is sufficiently complex that generalization is difficult. Recall that in
their model, with sufficiently low costs, fee shifting will improve accuracy, while
for sufficiently high costs, fee shifting will reduce accuracy. Certainly at the last
column of the third panel, where costs are high, fee shifting appears to increase
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inaccuracy in the broad middle of the true merits spectrum. These cases are
all settled but with a pooling equilibrium that gives everyone the same result.
One might think that would lead to good accuracy for cases in the middle of
the probability spectrum; after all, Figure 15 appears to show that these cases
receive middling settlement amounts. This, however, is a misimpression that
arises from averaging results for various levels of q in that right panel. Recall
that in fact with high costs and fee shifting, the offers will tend to settle at
extreme values, such as 0 where zΠ,∆ = 0 and 1 where zΠ,∆ = 1. The parties’
private information is thus ignored, and inaccuracy is high. On the extreme
ends of the q′ true merits spectrum, accuracy is much better, because for these
values to occur, the private information in fact must be consistent with the
shared information. But the regions with high accuracy are shorter, and so
it is fair to say that inaccuracy is high overall. With high costs but no fee
shifting, the shape is inverted, but overall accuracy appears marginally better.
Meanwhile, when costs are sufficiently low, the case is unclear, though accuracy
appears to be slightly better without fee shifting for cases in the middle range.
The pattern of how accuracy changes with costs and fee-shifting is complex,
and further analysis is warranted, including for example measuring average in-
accuracy with various definitions and examining alternative definitions of fee
shifting, as well as the possibilities of partial or multiple fee-shifting. For exam-
ple, Figure 25 demonstrates how inaccuracy changes with shifts in the amount
of information that is shared between the parties. The red single-dashed line
is the case in which the parties have no shared information; the orange double-
dashed line, 25% of the total information is shared; yellow triple-dashed, 50%;
and green, 75%. As one would expect, more information sharing generally
promotes accuracy. But this is not clearly true in some circumstances, such
as where costs and fee-shifting are both high. A paper focusing on accuracy
might explore these patterns in more detail. The goal of this paper is simply
to demonstrate how a computational model, in this case using no regret learn-
ing, can allow for principled inference about the possible effects of changing a
mathematical model.
3.3 Counterfactual Regret Minimization
The previous section illustrated that “no regret” learning algorithms allow the
parties to optimize their decisions by repeatedly playing the modeled game
against one another, assigning a probability distribution to all actions available
at each decision point. A limitation is that the decision points, as described
so far, are all decisions that each party makes at the beginning of the game
after receiving its signal. Indeed, the game requires a single action for each
player. The probability distributions that one player chooses will affect the other
player’s utilities and thus that player’s mixed probabilities in later iterations.
But no player’s action affects whether another player has a chance to choose
an action in the first place, or even whether the first player will need to make
another decision. In a more complex game, we must confront this difficulty. For
example, a decision by a plaintiff not to file a lawsuit means that the defendant
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Figure 25: Inaccuracy with different levels of information sharing
will not face any decisions at all. More importantly, assuming that the plaintiff
plays a mixed strategy in which the plaintiff sometimes files and sometimes does
not, the distribution of cases that face the defendent will depend on the mixed
strategy that the plaintiff chooses. Because “no regret” learning is robust to
adversaries, this is not inherently a problem. At each iteration, the defendant’s
utilities simply must be calculated based on the distribution of cases filed as a
result of the plaintiff’s strategy.
There is, however, a more complex type of dependency between players’
actions. One or more pieces of information in a player’s “information set”
(defined below) may be information about the choices that a player made earlier
in the game. Assuming that a defendant makes a settlement offer only when
the plaintiff files a case, it is meaningless to suggest that the fact of filing is
information within the defendant’s information set, because the plaintiff will
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always have filed when the defendant makes a settlement offer. But suppose
that bargaining fails, and each party must decide whether to proceed to trial
or to concede defeat (nonprosecution by the plaintiff or acceptance of default
by the defendant). That party will want to consider all available information in
assessing the plaintiff’s probability of victory, including the offer that the other
party made in settlement negotiations. The opponent’s offer will be part of a
litigant’s information set when deciding whether to continue to trial or concede.
Thus, “no regret” learning must apply separately at each information set.
More importantly, the game must be played for every permutation of possible
moves, including moves by both Chance and the players. Any given information
set may thus be reached through multiple paths in the same iteration. Suppose
the defendant’s information set following bargaining failure contains a quality
signal (say, 2 of a maximum 5) and the plaintiff’s offer level (say, 4 of 5 offer
levels). This information set is consistent with different possible signals that the
plaintiff received. It may be that for some such signals, given the defendant’s
strategy and information set, the game would have settled with 100% probabil-
ity, so those situations should receive no weight in formulating the defendant’s
response. But it may be that if the plaintiff received a quality signal of 3, 4,
or 5, there was still some positive probability that settlement would not occur
and that the defendant would face the default decision. Thus, the defendant
must determine what weight to assign to the utilities that the defendant re-
ceives with each of these quality signals that the plaintiff may have received.
The resolution to this conundrum is intuitive, albeit with a small twist: the
weight should be the probability of arriving at the information set through a
particular path, but ignoring the defendant’s own contributions to that proba-
bility. That is, if Chance makes a particular path unlikely (by assigning a signal
a low probability), then the utilities received from that path to the information
set should receive a low weight, and if a plaintiff will file a lawsuit given that
signal with only a low probabiliy, then the weight should be lower still. But if
the defendant had an earlier opportunity to default, it makes no difference what
the probability was that the defendant would do so.
This is the essence of counterfactual regret minimization, an algorithm de-
veloped by Zinkevich et al. (2008) [25]. We will provide some formalism here.
Let A represent the set of all actions that players, including the chance player,
may take. A game history consists of a sequence of actions from the beginning of
the game. Let H represent the set of all possible game histories, and let Z ⊂ H
represent the set of all possible completed game histories, including a separate
entry for each sequence of chance and player moves leading to the resolution
of the litigation. An information set consists of a subset of the actions in a
game history, representing the actions of which a player has knowledge at the
corresponding point in the game. Let I represent a particular information set,
and let ZI designate the set of all possible game histories in which the player to
whom the information set belongs chooses an action at that information set. Let
zI ∈ ZI represent a sequence of actions (whether or not known to the player to
whom I belongs) that includes an opportunity to make a decision at that infor-
mation set. We restrict our attention to games with perfect recall (i.e., a player
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remembers each move she has made), so a player can encounter a particular
information set no more than once in any game history.
Then, let σ represent the current strategy profile, i.e. the set of mixed strate-
gies that each player currently plays at each information set. Let πσ(zI) rep-
resent the probability that the players, including Chance, will make the set of
moves in the history zI leading up to information set I; the probability of moves
at and after information set I are thus ignored. For player φ, let πσφ(zI) rep-
resent player φ’s own contribution to this probability, i.e. the product of the
probabilities of actions that player φ must choose to arrive at information set I





φ(zI), i.e. the prob-
ability that other players, including Chance, play to the information set. For
any terminal history z ∈ ZI , let πσ(zI , z) represent the conditional probability,
given that player φ reaches information set I at history zI , that the completed
game is z, i.e. the probability of the actions at and after information set I by
all players along terminal history z. Finally, let Uφ(z) represent the utility that
player φ receives at this terminal history.
With these definitions, we can formally define the counterfactual value vφ





σ(zI , z)Uφ(z) (4)
Reading the equation from right to left after the summation, the counterfac-
tual value averages utilities that the player earns at terminal histories stemming
from the information set by the probabilities that the players will play from the
information set to each terminal history and the probabilities that the other
players will have played to the information set. Two-player poker may provide
some useful intuition. Suppose that a player is choosing what to bet. The
player’s information set includes all of the player’s cards, plus all the other
player’s cards that are face up at the table, plus all betting moves previously
made by the player or the player’s opponent. But there are many possible per-
mutations of face down cards that the other player may have, and for each of
these permutations, there may be many different ways that the game can play
out from here. Counterfactual regret minimization requires weighting the differ-
ent possible permutations of face down cards by the probability that those cards
could have been dealt and that the opponent would have taken any actions that
the opponent took with those face down cards. For example, for each possible
set of face down hands, there is some probability that the opponent would have
made a large bet (either because the face down cards were good for the opponent
or because the opponent was bluffing). Since each player knows its opponent’s
strategy, these calculations can be made explicitly. Similarly, the player can
compute, for each permutation of face down cards, every permutation of how
the game might proceed. This highlights why asymmetric information games
like poker are difficult to model: the player must not only consider all possible
future game paths but also all past game paths that might have led the player
to the current point.
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The counterfactual value vφ(σ, I) is analogous to the U
t
a in the discussion
of no regret learning in the previous section. Thus, we define the regret value
rt(I, a) = vφ(σ
t
I→a, I)−vφ(σt, I), where the notation σtI→a represents a strategy
identical to σt except that player φ, to whom information set I belongs, chooses
action a at that information set with probability 1. Then, the cumulative coun-
terfactual regret at information set I for action a through iteration T can be
defined as RT (I, a) =
∑T
t=1 r
t(I, a). “No regret” learning can then be applied,
for example as before in the form of regret matching:












t,+(I, b) = 0
(5)
The counterfactual regret minimization algorithm proceeds by walking the
entire game tree once at each iteration t for each player whose actions are to be
optimized, in this context the plaintiff and the defendant. Utilities are recorded
on the completion of the walk back from the tree.
There are many variations on the vanilla version of the counterfactual re-
gret minimization algorithm, designed to minimize the need to play information
sets that the players are highly unlikely to reach. See Lanctot (2013) [14] for
detailed algorithms. For very large games, a technique that integrates counter-
factual regret minimization with neural networks can allow for extrapolation.
See Steinberger (2019) [24]. We will not need to employ these here, as the set-
tlement bargaining games in this introductory article are manageable with full
walks through the tree.
We will, however, adopt two variations to the standard vanilla algorithm. In
experimentation, both of these proved helpful in generating better approximated
equilibria in the general sum litigation game. The first is an innovation offered
by Farina et al. (2017), who suggest defining a perturbation PT in iteration T
where 0 < PT < 1, requiring each action to be played with at least probability
PT . Farina et al. find that this improves strategy refinement. Even where a
strategy is a Nash equilibrium, some information sets may not be reached at all,
in which case the player blindly plays each action with equal probability. The
strategy thus may be susceptible to trembles, slight deviations by an opponent.
The perturbation ensures that every information set is visited, and thus we use
a small vanishing perturbation term, falling from 11,000 in the first iteration to
0 in the last iteration.
The second is a variation of an approach offered by Brown and Sandholm
(2018) [2]. They describe the approach of discounting regrets, so that recent
regrets count more in defining a player’s current strategy than regrets in early
iterations. They show that such discounting can have a dramatic effect on
performance. With settlement bargaining, for example, if in early iterations, a
defendant would offer to pay the maximum amount even in a very weak case,
without discounting it will take a long time before this effect is diluted. The
choice to use this technique, like the choice to employ a perturbation, was based
on informal experimentation showing better convergence with discounting. The
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particular discounting algorithm employed here is simple: All previous regrets
are multiplied by 0.99 after each iteration.
Brown and Sandholm provide convergence guarantees in zero-sum games,
but these do not apply here, and as noted above, the counterfactual regret
minimization algorithm does not offer strong convergence guarantees. However,
it retains the ε-coarse correlated equilibrium guarantee from no regret learning.
With the notation developed here, we may formalize this. For any ε > 0, there
















−φ),∀σ′φ ∈ Σ (6)
where Σ represents the set of all possible strategies. Once again, however, we
will see that although the technique we use provides no guarantee of converg-
ing to an approximate Nash equilibrium, the algorithm will produce strategies
quite close to equilibria for strategies that we test here. As before, we can
measure how close a strategy is to a Nash equilibrium by determining a best
response to the strategy for each player. An algorithm for determining a best
response is discussed in Johanson et al. (2011). This algorithm proceeds by
walking forward through the game tree to calculate πσ−φ, and then walking
backward from the leaves of the game tree to choose at each information set I






σ(ha, z), where πσ(ha, z) represents
the probability that the players will play from I to z where possible, excluding
the probability of choosing a at information set I. This expression accounts for
the relative probabilities of different histories leading to the information set, as
well as later information sets chosen earlier in the algorithm. Given a calculated
best response, one can compute the maximum amount that either player could
gain by changing strategies.
With counterfactual regret maximization thus defined, we can now define the
litigation game that will extend the model of Klerman, Lee, and Liu. We will
start with a simple version and add additional features afterward. We assume
that there are two types of cases, those in which the defendant is not truly liable
(TL = 0) and those in which the defendant is truly liable (TL = 1). A case may
have one of nLQ quality strengths with respect to liability. When the defendant
is truly liable, the case is more likely to be a strong one for the plaintiff, but
there may be some cases of true liability in which the case is weak, and some
cases in which the defendant is not truly liable but the case is nonetheless strong.
The distribution of the various case strengths depends on standard deviation
parameters σLQ and σ
′
LQ, where σLQ indicates how accurately litigants can
gauge litigation strength and σ′LQ indicates how closely litigation quality reflects
the true merits. If the legal rule were that the party first alphabetically wins,
then σLQ would be low, because the rule is easy to apply, but σ
′
LQ would be
high, because the rule bears virtually no connection to true liability.
Specifically, a mixture distribution is defined by aggregating in equal mea-
sure two normal distributions with standard deviation σ′LQ, one with mean 0
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(representing not truly liable cases) and one with mean 1 (representing truly
liable cases). The values in this mixture distribution are then partitioned into
nLQ litigation quality ranges that collectively span the real line. if σ
′
LQ is suffi-
ciently small, then each litigation quality range will consist virtually entirely of
a single true liability value, while if σ′LQ is sufficiently large, then each litigation
quality range will consist of both true liability values in almost equal measure.
Given a particular true liability value (either 0 or 1), the probability that the
case is of litigation quality i is the probability that the sum of the true liability
value (0 or 1) and a draw from a normal distribution with standard deviation
σLQ lies in the ith litigation quality range.
The plaintiff and the defendant each receive a signal of liability quality
strength, specifically one of nsL signals. The approach is akin to that for deter-
mining the probability of litigation quality based on truly liable values, with the
mixture distribution aggregating distributions for each litigation quality value.
The signal ranges, however, are defined so that if each liability quality strength
were of equal probability, there would be an equal probability of obtaining each
signal. Given an actual liability quality value (determined as above), the prob-
ability of signal i is the probability that the sum of that value and a draw from
a normal distribution with standard deviation σPL for the plaintiff or σDL for
the defendant lies in the ith signal range.
The parties may attempt to settle using Chatterjee-Samuelson bargaining,
and if settlement fails, a judge resolves the case. The judge will rule for the
plaintiff if the case is in the stronger half of case strengths or for the defendant
if the case is in the weaker half of case strengths.
Initially, let us start with nLQ = 2, mapping all truly liable cases to the
stronger point and all not truly liable cases to the weaker point. This approach
will allow us to begin with an approach truer to the Klerman, Lee, and Liu
approach, before we begin to extend it. Meanwhile, we set nsL = 20, σLQ =
0.4, σ′LQ = 0.5, σPL = 0.1, and σDL = 0.1. The last two numbers are more
consequential than the others and represent relatively small values for the noise.
Recall that the 50% hypothesis applies only in the limit as error becomes close
to 0. If we make the noise sufficiently small in a discrete model, then both
litigants will receive the same signal every time. This reveals a limitation of
computational models, but it also reveals the artificiality of the hypothesis,
since as the error rate goes to zero, so does the trial rate. Of course, the point
is to suggest that win rates should be close to 50% when error is relatively low,
and so we use a somewhat arbitrarily set relatively low error, embodied by σPL
and σDL.
We also set various parameters of the litigation game. We normalize damages
to 1 as before, and we set the parties’ trial costs CP = CD = 0.15. We also
impose on each party a fee of 0.05 for contesting a case; that will become
relevant later when the players are given an option to concede the litigation. We
ran a separate simulation for each value of pTL in {0.05, 0.10, ..., 0.95}, where
pTL represents the probability that the defendant is truly liable. As in the
“no regret” learning simulations, each simulation strongly converged, with the
calculated best response giving neither party more than approximately a 1.0×
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10−15 increase in utility from changing strategies. Indeed, in some cases, the
measured benefit from changing strategies to the best response was negative,
reflecting tiny rounding errors either in the learning function or in the best
response.
The results are illustrated in Figure 26. The vertical axis indicates the
plaintiff’s win rate, and the horizontal access the exogenous probability that
the plaintiff is truly liable, which in turn affects the distribution of liability
strength. The results hover around 0.5, though deviating a significant distance.
The deviations may be due to discreteness, as a result of rounding to particular
discrete signal values. (We ran several simulations not pictured here with larger
and smaller values for nsL and found that the values were generally closer to
0.5 with higher values of nsL.) These errors are larger near the ends of the
probability continuum, systematically erring in the direction of a higher win
rate for the party less likely exogenously to have a strong case. This may well
be a result of having a finite number of signals, in contrast to the Klerman,
Lee, and Liu model, which has no worst signal. Meanwhile, the dashed red
line indicates the trial rate using the same axis scale. The cases in the middle
of the probability spectrum are more likely to go to trial (though still quite
unlikely to do so). The win rate seems to deviate from 50% precisely where trial
becomes extraordinarily rare, where there are very few tried cases, magnifying
the effect of rounding signals to fit into discrete categories. Not visible from the
graph is another important observation: in each of the simulations, although
the simulation allowed for strategies with monotonically increasing strategies,
instead each party’s offer function was flat except at a single jump discontinuity.
This is consistent with the Klerman, Lee, and Liu model.










Figure 26: Win (and trial) rates for exogenous probability truly liable
We can now assess the effect of adding a greater number of liability strength
points, setting nLQ = 20, instead of nLQ = 2. This will help address the
question whether Klerman, Lee, and Liu’s results are driven by the existence
of just two strength points. Figure 27 illustrates the results, providing some
support for the proposition that Klerman, Lee, and Liu’s limitation to two
liability strength points is innocuous. The win rate line is in fact flatter than
before, hovering closer to 0.5. More liability strength points appear to smooth
out the inaccuracies associated with discontinuities. This provides support for
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the proposition that even where there are many case strength levels, the plaintiff
will win approximately 50% of cases regardless of the distribution of truly liable
cases. In addition, once again in each simulation each party’s offer function was
flat with a single jump discontinuity. The discontinuity point varied based on
the signals received, but the wider range of case types did not lead to an offer
function with more than two points. This is not proof that Klerman, Lee, and
Liu’s results extend to a model with many or infinite liability strength points,
but it suggests that the assumption of only two such points is not likely to be
the problem. The example highlights that discrete computational models may
be less useful when the goal is to prove an exact result (such as a plaintiff win
rate of exactly a particular percentage), but that even in such circumstances
they still may help rule out the possibility that results would change drastically
with a more complex model. The example also may give some encouragement
to a modeler interested in taking on the challenge of extending Klerman, Lee,
and Liu’s results to a larger or infinite number of case strengths.










Figure 27: Multiple strength points
We will now assess the impact of providing the players options. The sequenc-
ing is as follows: First, the plaintiff must decide whether to file a case. If the
plaintiff does not file, the plaintiff receives 0 damages and no fees are assessed.
Second, if the plaintiff does file, then the defendant must decide whether to an-
swer. If the defendant chooses not to answer, the defendant receives utility −1
and the plaintiff receives utility +1. Third, if the defendant answers, then each
party provides a settlement offer subject to the Chatterjee-Samuelson mech-
anism. If settlement occurs, then the defendant pays that amount of money
to the plaintiff, and each side bears its filing costs. Fourth, if settlement does
not occur, the plaintiff and the defendant simultaneously make choices about
whether to concede the litigation. Fifth, if one party concedes, the lawsuit
ends, and either the plaintiff receives nothing or the defendant pays full dam-
ages to the plaintiff, while each side bears its costs. If both parties concede,
then Chance chooses one party to concede to the other with equal probability.
Sixth, if settlement does not occur and neither party concedes, a trial is held.
The judge estimates the case liability quality with perfect precision. If the case
quality is in the lower half of case qualities, then the defendant wins; otherwise,
the plaintiff wins. Either way, each side bears its own costs.
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We set each party’s filing costs to 0.3 for this simulation, because with the
original value of 0.05, neither party ever conceded. The value of 0.3 is high
but might be plausible in a case with low stakes, such as a small claims case.
The simulations did not converge as strongly as in all the earlier simulations
in the paper. By switching to a best response, each side would be able to gain
approximately 0.002. For example, with the exogenous probability set to 0.5,
the plaintiff would be able to gain 0.0024 by switching to a best response, and
the defendant would be able to gain 0.00097. As this suggests, the greater inter-
activity among decisions makes full convergence more difficult in the settlement
bargaining game. Increasing the number of iterations, even into the millions,
cannot cause arbitrarily good convergence, even in average strategies, as oc-
curs in a zero-sum game like poker. Still, these are fairly strong equilibria for
practical purposes. A litigant reliably told that a lawyer was good enough at
settlement negotiations to be within 0.2% of the best possible negotiator would
think that fairly impressive. Humans are likely to be considerably further from
the equilibrium than that.
The results are illustrated in Figure 28. While there is still some zig-zagging
resulting from the discreteness of the model (particularly at the endpoints), a
relatively clear trend emerges. Contrary to the results above, it indicates that
the Priest-Klein 50%-limit hypothesis does not apply in the model with options.
When the exogenous probability of true liability falls below 0.5, the plaintiff win
rate drops, and when the exogneous probability of true liability rises above 0.5,
the plaintiff win rate rises.
The computational model points in a potentially promising area for future
research, and close examination provides at least a suggestive explanation of
this exception to Priest-Klein. When pTL = 0.2, the plaintiff files a complaint
in 32.3% of all possible cases, and the defendant answers in 11.8% of all possible
cases (about one-third of the cases that the plaintiff files). The asymmetry exists
because the fact that the plaintiff files provides the defendant information that
the plaintiff’s information suggests that the plaintiff has a strong case. Thus,
the defendant continues to settlement negotiations in fewer cases than if the
defendant had to make its decision simultaneous with the plaintiff. (The defen-
dant also gives up at higher rates after the failure of settlement negotiations,
quitting 1.0% of the time, compared to the plaintiff’s 0.4%.) The recognition
that the defendant will be prone to give up reasonably often may make the
plaintiff even more likely to pursue cases. The result is that the plaintiff will
have lower quality cases, on average, producing win rates lower than 50%.
A slightly different story can be told at the other side of the probability spec-
trum. With pTL = 0.8, the plaintiff files 85.0% of the time, and the defendant
answers 12.4%. On the one hand, the fact that the plaintiff has filed is a less
powerful signal with a distribution that includes more favorable cases for the
plaintiff, but on the other hand, more such cases make litigation less attractive
for the defendant. The parties quit after settlement bargaining failure at very
low rates. Because the defendant is choosing approximately the same propor-
tion of cases to fight as before but with a less powerful signal from the plaintiff,
the cases on average that the defendant contests will be less strong. This con-
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sideration is powerful enough to produce win rates greater than 50%. At least,
the data suggest that this is part of the story. A more complete account would
assess the impact of various changes in information structure and the litigation
game rules. A particular question of interest is what the outcome would be if
the plaintiff and defendant made their decisions whether to contest litigation
simultaneously. This would help clarify whether it is only timing driving the
results or whether additional factors are at work.










Figure 28: Options to concede
Our last question is whether uncertainty about damages affects win rates.
We proceed similarly as before. We allow for nDQ = 6 damages quality levels,
drawn evenly from the unit uniform distribution. We assume that these are
assigned to each case with equal probability. Then, each player receives one of
nsD = 6 signals of damages quality. We also set nLQ = 6 and nsL = 6, a lower
number from before because the algorithm must now run through 36 damages
signal-quality combinations for each liability signal-quality combination. The
damages signal is determined by adding the damages quality and a draw from
a normal distribution, with standard deviation σPD = 0.3 for the plaintiff and
σDD = 0.3 for the defendant. Note that we use a higher noise for damages than
for liability, because the claim that 50% win rates occur only with small error
applies to error about liability, not error about damages. The signal that each
player receives is determined by assigning each signal to a number evenly drawn
from the unit uniform distribution and identifying the value closest to the sum
of the actual damages quality and the noise term.
In these simulations, for analytic tractability in the small space remaining,
we returned to litigants with no option to concede the litigation (though the
computational model can easily incorporate damages uncertainty and options to
concede). Figure 29 illustrates the perhaps surprising results. One important
result is that trial rates are much higher, especially when the distribution of
cases is balanced with respect to liability, approaching 0.4. When the parties
have two types of uncertainty, each litigant must worry that if the opponent has
bad information on either liability or damages, the opponent will be especially
willling to settle. This lemons problem may make both parties relatively hesitant
to settle. This suggests a point about selection that appears to be overlooked in
the literature: Cases in which there are two forms of uncertainty may be much
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more likely to go to trial than cases in which there is only one issue. In addition,
where the overall distribution of cases aggregates a heterogeneous collection of
case types, some drawn from distributions featuring high probabilities of liability
and some from distributions featuring low probabilities of liability, the cases
with middling probabilities may be most likely to settle, producing a tendency
toward 50% win rates.
The final observation may appear paradoxical: When the exogenous prob-
ability of true liability is high and the distribution thus includes many strong
cases on liability for the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s win rate is very low, and when
there are few strong liability cases, the plaintiff’s win rate is very high. When
the population includes mostly strong cases, plaintiffs appear to be very choosy
about which cases they are willing to settle, preferring to increase their share of
the settlement surplus in cases that settle at the expense of losing at trial most
of the few cases in which the defendant’s signals suggest that the result is not as
favorable to the plaintiff as first appears. The reverse is true on the other side
of the probability continuum. This is not the place to explore this finding fully.
The results reinforce the computational model’s flexibility, highlighting oppo-
site effects with different changes in assumptions, in each case finding strong
approximations to Bayesian equilibria.










Figure 29: Uncertainty in damages as well as liability
4 Conclusion
The case for computational modeling in some area of inquiry becomes relatively
strong when mathematical modeling encounters severe limitations and when
computational algorithms can achieve the same goals as mathematical model-
ing. Settlement bargaining is difficult to model mathematically in a rigorously
Bayesian way with two-sided aysmmetric information. The literature has made
significant strides in doing so, tackling even issues such as fee shifting and the
selection of disputes for litigation with fully Bayesian models that incorporate
two-sided asymmetric information. The mathematical literature may well make
continued progress, either with articles featuring much longer proofs or perhaps
with the development of new mathematical modeling techniques that simplify
analysis. At least for now, however, the mathematical modeler of settlement
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bargaining faces severe trade-offs. The empirical results of the computational
extensions of existing models establishes that in at at least some cases, compu-
tational modeling can identify exact solutions to the settlement models, even
when adding additional features that mathematical modelers would not easily
be able to incorporate. Computational modelers cannot prove that particu-
lar relationships exist among variables, but they can explore many different
parameter values. Computation should not replace mathematical models, but
where computational techniques are available, the combination of mathematical
proofs involving simplified assumptions and computational extensions may be
more powerful than proofs alone.
Even the computational models described here are quite limited, however, in
what they can accomplish, at least in comparison to the complexity of adjudi-
cation. A challenge for future research is to extend the algorithmic game theory
techniques used here to larger games. A significant challenge is that of mul-
tiple equilibria. When the computational modeling techniques described here
succeed in identifying an equilibrium, they provide no way of assessing whether
other equilibria exist. Mathematical modelers also sometimes prove the exis-
tence of an equilibrium without establishing its uniqueness, so the flaw is not
fatal. But it may be useful for computational techniques to be able to identify
families of equilibria rather than just individual equilibria. This may be par-
ticularly important with more complex games, for example involving multiple
rounds of bargaining, gradual learning by the players of relevant evidence, and
endogenous disputes within models of particular areas of substantive law, where
multiple equilibria may be more likely to exist. In the meantime, further work
on existing techniques is needed to assess to what types of law-and-economics
models and extensions computational techniques are well suited.
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